Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Simran Jit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitioned the Ninth Circuit, representing himself, to review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board had dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The panel found the case suitable for decision without oral argument and issued an unpublished memorandum on November 3, 2026.
The court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. section 1252 and reviewed questions of law and constitutional claims de novo. Singh's opening brief did not take on several determinations the agency had made, including those on adverse credibility, corroboration, competency, and compliance with Matter of Lozada. He separately argued that the immigration judge's denial of a continuance violated due process and kept him from fully presenting his claim. He also had a pending motion to stay removal. The memorandum does not describe the underlying facts of his claimed persecution or fear of torture, and it does not discuss the agency's reasoning in detail.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. Because Singh's opening brief did not challenge the agency's determinations on adverse credibility, corroboration, competency, and Matter of Lozada compliance, the panel declined to address them, citing Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder. Those determinations therefore remain undisturbed, and the court did not say whether they were correct on the merits.
In light of that disposition, the court did not reach Singh's remaining contentions about ineffective assistance of counsel, relying on Simeonov v. Ashcroft for the principle that courts and agencies need not decide issues unnecessary to the result they reach. The court also refused to consider issues raised for the first time in Singh's reply brief, treating them as waived under Nguyen v. Barr.
The panel rejected Singh's claim that the denial of a continuance violated due process and prevented him from fully presenting his claim, holding that it failed for lack of prejudice. Citing Colmenar v. INS, it explained that prejudice means the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation. It added, citing Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, that traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as due process violations are not colorable constitutional claims that would invoke the court's jurisdiction. Finally, the court denied the motion to stay removal as moot. The disposition is a denial of the petition, not a remand, and it grants Singh no relief.
Key Takeaways
- A petitioner who does not challenge adverse credibility, corroboration, or similar agency determinations in the opening brief leaves those determinations unreviewed, and the Ninth Circuit will not address them.
- Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived, so a reply cannot cure omissions from the opening brief.
- A due process challenge to the denial of a continuance requires prejudice, meaning the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.
- Relabeling an abuse of discretion complaint as a due process violation does not create a colorable constitutional claim that supports jurisdiction.
- Because the court resolved the petition on briefing and prejudice grounds, it did not reach the ineffective assistance contentions, and the stay motion was denied as moot.
Why It Matters
This is a not-for-publication memorandum disposition. As the memorandum itself states, it is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so it is not binding authority and mainly restates settled principles from the cases it cites. Its value is as an illustration of how the court applies those principles to a self-represented petitioner whose opening brief left major agency findings untouched.
The decision also shows how much remains undecided. The panel did not review the merits of the credibility, corroboration, and competency determinations, and it did not resolve the ineffective assistance contentions. Practitioners should take from it that the opening brief must squarely challenge each dispositive agency finding, and that a continuance-based due process argument needs a concrete explanation of how the outcome might have changed. Because the court denied the petition rather than remanding, the agency's order stands as reviewed. The memorandum also does not decide whether any other avenue of relief remains available to Singh.