Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Sevada Sholian, a Russian citizen, applied for admission at a port of entry near San Ysidro, California, on June 7, 2023. He was served with a Notice to Appear charging that he lacked an immigrant visa, and he says DHS later released him on recognizance. Respondents represent that he was arrested repeatedly after entering the country; the court made no findings on those earlier arrests. In April 2026 the Burbank Police Department arrested him on several state charges, including identity theft under California Penal Code section 530.5, and ICE officers then took him into custody at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center.
Sholian filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 on May 18, 2026, along with a request for a temporary restraining order that the court denied on July 2, 2026. He argued that detention without notice, an individualized custody redetermination, or a hearing on danger and flight risk violated the Fifth Amendment, and he asked for release. He said he received no documents at arrest. Respondents answered that officers served an arrest warrant and a Notice of Custody Determination (Form I-286) and that detention was authorized under 8 U.S.C. sections 1225(b)(1), 1226(a), and 1226(c)(1)(E)(i). The parties consented to a magistrate judge.
The Court’s Holding
The court found jurisdiction under section 2241, relying on Ninth Circuit authority that habeas remains available to noncitizens challenging executive detention, and held that 8 U.S.C. section 1252(g) does not bar review. Applying Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, it read section 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention as limited to people seeking admission at the border or a port of entry. Because the record indicated Sholian lived in and was detained in the interior, he fell under section 1226, and the Due Process Clause protects his substantial liberty interest in freedom from confinement. The order does not separately rule on the government's section 1225(b)(1) and 1226(a) theories.
The dispositive ground was section 1226(c)(1)(E), added by the Laken Riley Act in January 2025. It mandates detention of a noncitizen inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) who is charged with, arrested for, or convicted of burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or certain other offenses. The court relied on the Form I-213, which the Ninth Circuit presumes reliable absent contrary evidence from the noncitizen. The form showed an inadmissibility charge under section 1182(a)(7) and an arrest for identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5 (dated April 11 in the I-213 discussion, though the order's fact section places the Burbank arrest on April 12). Sholian did not contest those facts or offer evidence, arguing only that no qualifying ground was identified. The court also noted that the warrant and the I-213's reference to Form I-286 went unaddressed by him, and concluded he is subject to mandatory detention.
The court denied the petition and directed that judgment be entered denying it. It also ordered that Sholian and the court receive at least three days' notice before he is removed from this jurisdiction. The order does not state whether the denial is with or without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- An arrest, without a conviction, for identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, paired with an inadmissibility charge under section 1182(a)(7), was enough here for mandatory detention under section 1226(c)(1)(E); the order does not separately analyze whether identity theft is a listed theft offense.
- Interior detention generally falls under section 1226 rather than section 1225(b)(2)(A), but that does not help a person who also meets a section 1226(c) category.
- An authenticated Form I-213 is presumed reliable, so a detainee who offers no contrary evidence faces a difficult path.
- Unrebutted evidence of a warrant and Form I-286 supported the court's view of the record, but the denial rested on the statute rather than a detailed procedural due process analysis.
- Denial came with a court-ordered three-day notice requirement before removal from the jurisdiction.
Why It Matters
This is a district-court order by a magistrate judge sitting by consent. It is not a reported or precedential opinion, but it shows how the Laken Riley Act is being applied together with the Ninth Circuit's Rodriguez Vazquez decision in the Central District of California.
Open questions remain, including whether identity theft counts as a listed theft offense, whether an arrest alone suffices, and what process the Due Process Clause requires under section 1226(c). Sholian did not contest the record, so the court did not resolve them. His removal case proceeds separately, and the order decides nothing about relief from removal.