California Case Summaries

Shirley Bobb Sequeira v. Sergio Albarran, et al. — Court requires notice and a pre-detention hearing before immigration officials may re-detain the petitioner

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Shirley Bobb Sequeira v. Sergio Albarran, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Judge
Jon S. Tigar (Barack Obama, 2013)
Date Decided
2026-11-04
Docket No.
4:26-cv-12133
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration detention, habeas corpus, preliminary injunction, procedural due process, pre-deprivation hearing, burden of proof, judicial jurisdiction, changed circumstances

Background

Shirley Bobb Sequeira fled Nicaragua in 2023 and entered the United States without inspection on or about October 23, 2023. She was apprehended and released within 24 hours, then reported to Immigration and Customs Enforcement under its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program. Her asylum, withholding-of-removal, and Convention Against Torture applications had been pending since September 15, 2025. Police detained her for several hours in December 2025 and released her with a court date. The government alleged a driving-under-the-influence arrest and charge, but its Form I-213 did not say she was charged, and a private investigator found no San Joaquin County criminal records naming her as a defendant.

ICE re-detained Bobb Sequeira on October 19, 2026, at a check-in at the San Francisco Field Office. She petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and sought a temporary restraining order, asserting Administrative Procedure Act, procedural due process, and substantive due process claims against officials in their official capacities. Judge Jon S. Tigar granted the temporary restraining order and ordered the respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; the government released her on October 20, 2026. The present order decides the preliminary-injunction request, not the final merits of the habeas petition.

The Court’s Holding

The court rejected three jurisdictional objections. It held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law, that administrative exhaustion was unnecessary because the agency could not decide the constitutional challenge, and that § 1252(g) did not bar relief because Bobb Sequeira was not subject to a final executable removal order. The court expressly found jurisdiction over her procedural due process claim.

Applying the Winter standard and the Mathews v. Eldridge framework, the court concluded that all three Mathews factors require notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that detention is justified. Her initial release reflected a government determination that she was neither dangerous nor a flight risk, so the government initiating re-detention must justify the change. The court rejected a less demanding standard, any denial of Fifth Amendment protection based on her manner of entry, and any emergency based on the December 2025 arrest, which was ten months old, produced no conviction, and lacked evidence of an ultimate charge.

The remaining Winter factors favored relief: deprivation of constitutional rights is irreparable injury, the public interest supports procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the government suffers no cognizable harm from being enjoined against constitutional violations. The order enjoins re-detention without notice and a hearing before a neutral immigration judge, bars transfer out of the district or deportation pending the habeas proceedings, requires no security, and remains in effect until further order or a final executable removal order. Because procedural due process was dispositive, the court did not decide the substantive due process or Garro Pinchi claims.

Key Takeaways

  • Immigration officials cannot re-detain Bobb Sequeira without advance notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration judge.
  • The government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that changed circumstances make her a danger or flight risk that only detention can mitigate.
  • A ten-month-old DUI arrest, without evidence of a charge or conviction, did not create the urgency needed for a post-deprivation hearing.
  • The injunction also bars transfer out of the district or deportation while the habeas proceedings remain pending, until further order or a final executable removal order.
  • The parties must confer and, within 14 days, propose a schedule for the rest of the case or stipulate that the order's reasoning warrants granting the petition.

Why It Matters

The decision applies settled due process principles to when immigration authorities may revoke release and return a person to custody. It treats the government's earlier release decision as key to allocating the burden and requires concrete changed circumstances rather than reliance on an old, undocumented arrest. Though preliminary and case-specific, it details the hearing, decisionmaker, evidence standard, and justification required before re-detention.

The order leaves the habeas case alive and does not resolve every claim, and its preservation of detention authority after a final executable removal order limits the relief's scope. The required follow-up filing will determine whether the parties agree the reasoning supports granting the petition or need a schedule for further proceedings.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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