Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Yodorky Rojas Pena, a citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the United States through the Cuban parole process at Miami International Airport on March 15, 2024. Respondents acknowledged in their filing that this was a release from immigration custody on parole issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). According to the petition, while living in the United States he applied to USCIS for adjustment of status, obtained valid employment authorization, and worked for an electricity company in Florida. ICE officers detained him in Florida on July 24, 2026, and he is now held at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in the Southern District of California.
Rojas Pena filed a verified emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents said they had insufficient information about whether his parole had been terminated. They asserted that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160, does not apply to him. Even so, they stated that they did not oppose the petition and deferred to the Court on the appropriate relief.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition in a short order. Its stated basis was Respondents' non-opposition, together with the court's many earlier orders granting similar petitions. The order does not contain a detailed analysis of the parole or mandatory-detention arguments, and it does not decide whether section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) governs a parolee in Petitioner's position as a general matter. The facts about his parole, work history, and detention come from the petition and were not the subject of contested fact-finding.
The court separately found that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, is the appropriate remedy. It relied on district court decisions from the Western District of Washington and the Northern District of California reasoning that a post-detention bond hearing cannot adequately protect against an erroneous deprivation of liberty, because the injury has already occurred by the time the hearing is held.
The relief has three parts. First, Respondents must immediately release Petitioner, subject to the terms of his preexisting parole. Second, before any re-detention, he must receive a hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention is warranted. At that hearing the noncitizen bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland. Third, if the immigration judge finds bond appropriate, the judge must consider alternative conditions of release and the person's ability to pay, citing Hernandez v. Sessions. The order does not bar all future detention, but it conditions re-detention on the prescribed hearing.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted a Cuban parolee's section 2241 petition largely because Respondents did not oppose it and the court had granted comparable petitions before.
- The remedy was immediate release subject to the terms of his existing parole, not merely a bond hearing, because a post-detention hearing cannot undo an erroneous deprivation of liberty.
- Re-detention is not categorically barred, but it requires a prior hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
- At that hearing the noncitizen carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.
- If bond is appropriate, the immigration judge must weigh alternative conditions of release and the person's ability to pay.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order in a single case, so it carries no binding precedential weight, and it rests largely on the government's non-opposition rather than on a contested ruling. A footnote points to a collection of earlier orders from the same court, which indicates that the judge has repeatedly granted similar petitions, but this order does not itself analyze them.
Much remains open. The court did not resolve whether Petitioner's parole was lawfully terminated, whether section 1225(b) mandatory detention applies to parolees, or the reach of Rodriguez Vasquez. The order also leaves the government free to seek re-detention after providing the specified hearing, and the burden it places on the noncitizen at that hearing may be contested in other cases. Practitioners should read it as a remedy-focused ruling on an unopposed petition.