Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Aaron Matia Rodriguez Caneo, a native of Chile, was admitted on a B2 visa in 1993 at age five; the visa expired in 1994, and he has lived in the United States continuously for thirty-three years. His mother naturalized in 2002, three brothers are citizens, and a sibling is a lawful permanent resident. He worked as a barber and supported his mother. He says an approved Form I-130 petition supports his adjustment of status, but the court noted that neither party said when any approval occurred. Around December 5, 2025, he was stopped for driving without a valid license, transferred to ICE custody, and served a Notice to Appear charging that he overstayed his visa under 8 U.S.C. section 1227(a)(1)(B).
On March 31, 2026, an immigration judge ordered release on a $5,000 bond with conditions. The same day the judge granted the government's reconsideration motion, which cited inconsistencies about traffic arrests and an alleged stalking-related protective order, and set the bond aside without stating grounds. Petitioner requested a second custody hearing but withdrew the request for unexplained reasons. On May 20, 2026, an immigration judge dismissed the removal case, yet respondents transferred him to another facility and on May 26 served a renewed Notice to Appear on the same charge. That renewed case remained undecided, and he had been detained over ten months. Both sides agreed that section 1226(a) governs. Respondents argued he failed to exhaust by not appealing the bond ruling or seeking a renewed hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court treated exhaustion on habeas review under section 2241 as prudential rather than jurisdictional and declined to require it. In the Ninth Circuit decision it contrasted, the petitioner attacked the bond decision itself, an error the Board of Immigration Appeals could correct. Here Petitioner argued that his detention had over time become punitive, and the agency has no special expertise on that constitutional question, so the court reached the merits.
Noting that courts in the circuit use different approaches, the court applied the five-factor test from Doe v. Becerra, which another Eastern District judge had adopted, and found that on balance the factors favored Petitioner. Length: over ten months is prolonged and longer than periods referenced in Zadvydas and Demore, but standing alone it does not violate due process. Delay: this favored Petitioner because the government chose to restart proceedings after dismissal and kept him detained; the court found it unclear whether continuances by either side caused later delay but held the government largely responsible. Flight risk and danger: the record was mixed, but the immigration judge's earlier bond order was the critical fact, and because the reconsideration order gave no alternative findings, a present finding of dangerousness or flight risk would be unwarranted. Alternatives: this favored Petitioner because respondents offered no evidence or argument that the earlier bond conditions were insufficient. Conditions of confinement: neutral, because his medical claims were unsupported by evidence.
The court concluded that ten months of detention, despite an earlier finding that release was appropriate and the government's restart of dismissed proceedings, was excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose. It granted the amended petition as to count five, ordered release within seven days, and allowed respondents to impose additional conditions to ensure public safety and mitigate flight risk. It did not consider the remaining claims.
Key Takeaways
- Prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(a) can violate substantive due process when it is excessive relative to its purposes of preventing flight and protecting the public.
- A challenge framed as a constitutional claim that detention has become punitive, rather than as a challenge to a bond ruling, may proceed without exhausting Board of Immigration Appeals review.
- Dismissing and restarting removal proceedings on the same ground while keeping a person detained weighed against the government.
- Ten months alone was not enough, so the result rested on balancing the length with the earlier bond finding, government-driven delay, and the absence of evidence that bond conditions would fail.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order in a single habeas case and is not binding precedent. Courts in the circuit use different tests, and the court acknowledged the Mathews v. Eldridge alternative. Its reasoning may nonetheless be persuasive in similar challenges to prolonged section 1226(a) detention.
The relief is limited to release within seven days, with respondents free to impose additional conditions. The removal proceedings are not ended: the renewed Notice to Appear remains pending, and the court did not decide Petitioner's other claims or any eligibility for adjustment of status or other relief.