Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rodolfo Valdez Becerra was removed from the United States to Mexico in June 2018 but returned around November 2021 and had been living in California with his partner and her three minor children. On October 27, 2026, ICE officers detained him during a vehicle stop in Hayward, California. The officers pulled over the van in which he was a passenger, reached through the windows, unlocked the doors, and pulled him out. He was handcuffed, placed in a chain, and transported to the ICE San Francisco Field Office.
Later that same day, a Deportation Officer issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order (Form I-871), and a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer signed the decision reinstating the 2018 removal order. The same officer also signed a Warrant of Removal/Deportation (Form I-205). Petitioner signed the acknowledgment section as 'Refused.' He was detained in California City, California, and expressed a fear of returning to Mexico while awaiting a reasonable fear interview.
On the same day he was detained, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking his release from custody and to enjoin Respondents from re-detaining him absent prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The duty judge filed an order prohibiting Petitioner's removal from the United States to preserve jurisdiction. After oral argument on November 4, 2026, the Court granted the TRO and ordered Petitioner released, with this written order to follow.
The Court’s Holding
The Court held that Petitioner demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment because, at the time the government detained him, it had no statutory authority for the detention. The Court concluded that the government must complete reinstatement of the removal order prior to relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1231 as the basis for detention. Both the language of the statute and its implementing regulations require findings from the Attorney General or determinations from an immigration officer before the order of removal is reinstated, and such findings seem unlikely to occur in the brief moments between discovery and detention by the same officers.
The Court also found that 8 U.S.C. § 1357 did not authorize the detention: that statute requires two determinations, unlawful presence and likelihood of escape, Respondents did not rely on it, and there was no support for a reasonable belief that Petitioner was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. On the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court held that even assuming Petitioner was seized without a warrant and without probable cause, release is not the appropriate remedy, because the body or identity of a respondent is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, and the Court declined to decide whether the Fourth Amendment was violated on the limited record before it.
The Court determined that release was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation, as the typical remedy for unlawful executive detention is release, and rejected the argument that the subsequent reinstatement cured the unlawful arrest because sustaining detention would substantially diminish the limits Congress placed on warrantless arrests. The Court also found that Petitioner demonstrated irreparable injury, that the balance of equities and public interest weighed heavily in his favor, and that it had jurisdiction to hear the challenge despite the government's arguments under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9).
Key Takeaways
- The government must complete reinstatement of a prior removal order before detaining an individual under 8 U.S.C. § 1231; detention cannot precede reinstatement.
- A warrantless arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 requires both a reasonable belief of unlawful presence and a reasonable belief that the individual is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.
- The typical remedy for unlawful executive detention is release, even if the government later completes the procedures it was required to follow before making the arrest.
- A Fourth Amendment violation does not itself provide a basis for release from immigration detention; the body or identity of a respondent is not suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.
- District courts retain jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders, notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9).
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that immigration authorities must follow statutory procedures in the correct sequence and cannot detain individuals first and complete the required paperwork afterward. The ruling emphasizes that the statutory scheme requires specific findings and determinations before detention is authorized, and that courts will not permit the government to bypass these requirements by completing them retroactively after litigation has commenced.
The decision also clarifies that release is an appropriate remedy for unlawful detention even when the government subsequently obtains authority to detain. By ordering Petitioner's immediate release to restore the status quo, the Court signaled that allowing the government to benefit from completing procedures after the fact would undermine the statutory limits Congress placed on warrantless arrests and detention.