Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rhoun Ricardo Vanhorne, a citizen and native of Jamaica, entered the United States without inspection on or around July 27, 2022, was detained by U.S. Border Patrol, and was released with a Notice to Appear. On February 23, 2026, he was arrested in Florida for misdemeanor battery and felony domestic battery by strangulation; those charges were dropped or abandoned on March 23, 2026. Custody was transferred from the Palm Beach County Jail to ICE on February 24, 2026, and on June 3, 2026 an immigration judge denied him bond based on a finding that he posed a danger to the community.
Vanhorne filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 16, 2026, challenging his re-detention, and also moved for appointment of counsel. On September 17, 2026, the district judge ordered that respondents not remove or transfer him out of the district while the petition was pending and referred the matter to the assigned magistrate judge. Respondents moved to dismiss on September 30, 2026, arguing that Vanhorne was lawfully detained under either 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), the Laken Riley Act's mandatory-detention provision, or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends that respondents' motion to dismiss be granted. On the statutory claim, the recommended findings are that Vanhorne is not detained under § 1226(c)(1)(E): the record contains no evidence of an arrest for petit theft, and the domestic-battery-by-strangulation charge was dropped or abandoned. Following Singh v. Chestnut and similar decisions, the recommendation construes the Laken Riley Act to require a current charge or arrest for an enumerated offense, not merely a dropped charge. The recommendation instead places Vanhorne under § 1226(a), which entitles him to an initial bond hearing; because he received that hearing on June 3, 2026, the statutory claim should be denied.
On the Fifth Amendment due-process claim, the recommendation is that prolonged detention under § 1226(a) does not entitle Vanhorne to relief. Citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the magistrate judge recommends finding that § 1226(a)'s procedures satisfy due process and that Vanhorne has not shown his case is distinguishable from Rodriguez Diaz. Separately, the order denies without prejudice Vanhorne's motion for appointment of counsel because the interests of justice do not require appointment. The dismissal-related directives are recommendations to the district judge, while the counsel denial is an operative order.
Key Takeaways
- The Laken Riley Act's mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) turns on a current charge or arrest for an enumerated offense; dropped or abandoned charges do not trigger mandatory detention.
- A noncitizen present without admission who is apprehended in the interior of the United States is detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), under Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock.
- Receipt of an initial bond hearing satisfies § 1226(a)'s procedural requirement, and denial of bond at that hearing does not state a habeas claim where the petitioner does not challenge the hearing's result.
- Prolonged detention under § 1226(a) does not violate due process unless the petitioner distinguishes the case from Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland.
- There is no absolute right to appointed counsel in habeas proceedings, and the magistrate judge ordered denial of Vanhorne's motion without prejudice; the dismissal recommendation remains subject to district-judge review and objections.
Why It Matters
The recommendation adds to the federal courts' growing consensus that the Laken Riley Act's mandatory-detention provision applies only to noncitizens currently charged with or arrested for qualifying offenses, not to those whose charges were dropped or never filed. It also reinforces the line between § 1225 detention for arriving aliens and § 1226 detention for noncitizens apprehended inside the United States, preserving the latter group's access to bond hearings.
For practitioners, the order illustrates that a habeas petitioner detained under § 1226(a) must do more than point to the length of detention after an initial bond hearing; absent distinguishing facts under Rodriguez Diaz, the due-process claim fails. The document also shows the procedural split in a magistrate-judge ruling: counsel denial is ordered now, while dismissal, entry of judgment, and closure are only recommended.