Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rene Lorenzo Fernandez Garcia, a Cuban citizen and former lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed on February 1, 2016, after waiving appeal. He was released on an order of supervision in May 2018 but was taken back into ICE custody on February 16, 2026, following an arrest for aggravated battery in Florida. By the time of the court's ruling, Garcia had been detained for over six months under a final removal order. The government argued his detention was mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and contended he could be removed to Cuba or, alternatively, to Mexico as a third country if he cooperated.
Garcia filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing his continued detention violated the Due Process Clause because it had become unreasonably prolonged with no significant likelihood of removal. The government responded that Garcia had been detained only eight days beyond the six-month presumptive period and maintained that repatriation efforts to Cuba were ongoing, while also asserting that removal to Mexico was possible with Garcia's cooperation. The court applied the burden-shifting framework from Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), under which detention is presumptively reasonable for six months post-removal-order, after which the detainee must show no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, shifting the burden to the government to rebut that showing.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition and ordered Garcia's immediate release. It found that Garcia satisfied his initial burden under Zadvydas: his removal order was over a decade old, he had been detained for more than six months, and the government offered no evidence it was closer to effecting removal than at the outset of detention. The court held the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to either Cuba or Mexico.
Regarding Cuba, the government merely stated the removal order 'may be lawfully executed once repatriation to Cuba is resolved' without providing evidence of progress or a timeline. Regarding Mexico, the court rejected the government's argument that Garcia's cooperation could facilitate third-country removal, citing precedent that the government cannot detain a noncitizen for refusing to voluntarily depart to a country to which he has no legal obligation to go, and noting that third-country removal is 'exceedingly rare.' The court enjoined re-detention unless material changed circumstances arise and a neutral decisionmaker finds a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Key Takeaways
- Detention beyond six months under a final removal order triggers Zadvydas burden-shifting: the detainee must show no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, then the government must rebut with evidence.
- The government's bare assertion that repatriation to the designated country (Cuba) is being pursued, without evidence of progress or timeline, is insufficient to justify continued detention.
- Third-country removal (here, to Mexico) cannot serve as a basis for prolonged detention when the noncitizen has no legal obligation to accept removal to that country and such removals are exceedingly rare.
- Conditioning a detainee's release on cooperation with voluntary departure to a third country is impermissible; the government cannot detain someone for refusing to go to a country they are not from.
- The court's injunction against re-detention requires material changed circumstances and a neutral decisionmaker's finding of a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the constitutional limits on post-removal-order detention established in Zadvydas v. Davis, emphasizing that the government must provide concrete evidence of likely removal—not mere speculation or conditional third-country arrangements—to justify detention beyond the presumptively reasonable six-month period. The ruling clarifies that third-country removal cannot be used as a lever to prolong detention when the detainee has no legal obligation to accept it, and it underscores the judiciary's role in scrutinizing the government's repatriation efforts rather than accepting conclusory assertions. The injunction against re-detention absent changed circumstances and a neutral determination adds a procedural safeguard against cyclical detention practices.