Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ramzi Faisal Saleh Al Naqeeb, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 15, 2026, challenging a condition of his release from immigration custody. He had been released on bond under a September 15, 2025 order that expressly allowed the Department of Homeland Security to impose Alternatives to Detention, including electronic monitoring, at its discretion. Upon his release on September 29, 2025, ICE placed him on GPS ankle monitoring.
On October 23, 2025, Al Naqeeb filed a bond redetermination request asking the Immigration Judge to modify one condition of the September 15 order — his living arrangement — and the IJ granted that request the next day, allowing him to live in his own apartment rather than with a sponsor. He did not challenge any other provision of the order through that administrative process. In his habeas petition, he argued that the continued ankle monitor requirement was unlawful and asked the district court to order DHS to remove it.
The Court’s Holding
The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but declined to waive the prudential exhaustion requirement. Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the court explained that habeas petitioners must ordinarily exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241, and that when a petitioner has not done so, a district court should ordinarily dismiss without prejudice or stay the proceedings unless exhaustion is excused.
The court found that Al Naqeeb had not used the administrative remedies available to him to challenge the ankle monitor. Although he had successfully sought modification of a different condition of the same September 15, 2025 order through a bond redetermination request, he never made a similar administrative request challenging the IJ's authorization of electronic monitoring. The court reasoned that addressing the merits of his claim would circumvent the statutory role of the IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals in addressing matters of bond.
The court declined to excuse or waive the exhaustion requirement and denied the petition, expressly stating that the ruling was without prejudice to any challenge brought once the agency has had the opportunity to address the petitioner's claimed errors. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen released on bond who wants to challenge an electronic monitoring condition must first pursue administrative remedies, such as a bond redetermination request to the Immigration Judge, before filing a federal habeas petition.
- The court confirmed it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the § 2241 petition but treated exhaustion as a prudential requirement it would not waive on these facts.
- The petitioner had already shown the administrative process could work by successfully modifying his living-arrangement condition, yet he never used the same process to challenge the ankle monitor.
- The denial was without prejudice, leaving the petitioner free to return to court after giving the agency an opportunity to address his claims.
- The decision illustrates how courts apply the Ninth Circuit's prudential exhaustion framework from Castro Cortez, Hernandez v. Sessions, and Leonardo v. Crawford to immigration custody conditions.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces that challenges to Alternatives to Detention conditions, such as GPS ankle monitors imposed after a bond release, generally must be exhausted before the immigration judge and the BIA before a federal court will reach the merits. It underscores that the prudential exhaustion doctrine remains a significant gatekeeping tool in immigration habeas cases, even where the district court acknowledges jurisdiction.
For practitioners and pro se petitioners alike, the case offers a practical lesson: the same bond redetermination mechanism used to modify one release condition can and should be used to challenge others, and skipping that step risks dismissal without prejudice rather than a merits ruling.