Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Cesar Alejandro Ortuno Ortuno, an immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention at the California City Immigration Processing Center. The petition was referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. The order indicates he was detained in September 2026.
On October 8, 2026, the magistrate judge recommended granting the petition. The magistrate judge rejected the government's argument that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), relying on the district judge's decisions in Selis Tinoco v. Noem, Labrador-Prato v. Noem, D.L.C. v. Wofford, and Altin v. Chestnut. Unlike the petitioners ordered released in those cases, however, the magistrate judge recommended only a post-deprivation bond hearing because of Ortuno Ortuno's recent arrest for driving under the influence.
Respondent objected on October 15, 2026, solely by reference to the arguments in its response to the petition. The district judge found those arguments had already been rejected. In the earlier cases, which largely granted temporary restraining orders, the court had concluded that due process requires a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, at which bond eligibility is considered, before the government re-detains a noncitizen previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
The Court’s Holding
Judge Dena Coggins adopted the findings and recommendations in part and granted the petition. The court presumed the magistrate judge's factual findings correct, reviewed legal conclusions de novo, and found the recommendations supported by the record and analysis. The departure concerned remedy only: consistent with its recent decisions, the court found immediate release, not a post-deprivation hearing, to be the appropriate relief.
On the criminal history, the court noted that Respondent neither argued nor explained why the DUI matter makes its earlier ruling inapplicable to similarly situated noncitizens. The court was unpersuaded that a mere mention of a DUI charge, which the criminal justice system is handling through ongoing proceedings, showed Petitioner was not entitled to due process before his immigration detention. It cited other orders from the district in which release was ordered where the government offered no argument connecting a petitioner's criminal history or arrest to the case.
The order requires immediate release on the same conditions that applied before the September 2026 detention, with no added restriction such as electronic monitoring unless a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing finds it necessary. Respondent must return Petitioner's documents and possessions and file a notice of compliance within three days. If the government seeks to re-detain him, it must give at least seven days' notice and hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter who considers bond eligibility. The order does not address detention if Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of it. Judgment was entered for Petitioner and the case closed.
Key Takeaways
- In this court's view, due process requires notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before immigration authorities re-detain a noncitizen previously released on bond, conditional parole, or humanitarian parole.
- A bare reference to a pending DUI charge did not explain why the petitioner was not entitled to process, particularly where the government made no argument tying the charge to the case.
- The court chose immediate release over the magistrate judge's recommended post-deprivation hearing, and barred added restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless a future hearing finds them necessary.
- Any re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which bond eligibility is considered.
- The order leaves open the government's authority to detain Petitioner under an executable final order of removal.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order, so it binds only the parties and carries persuasive weight at most. It applies the same judge's earlier reasoning, some of which arose at the temporary restraining order stage, to a new petitioner. It also shows that a government reference to criminal history, without developed argument, will not displace that reasoning.
The ruling is notable for its remedy. The court rejected the magistrate judge's more limited approach and ordered release, while preserving the government's ability to seek re-detention through a noticed hearing. It does not decide whether a developed showing about criminal history could change the outcome, and it expressly leaves open detention under a final removal order.