California Case Summaries

Moises Sanchez Altunaga v. Warden of Central Valley Annex Detention Facility — Court Denies Temporary Restraining Order Because Pending Theft Charge Triggers Mandatory Immigration Detention

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Moises Sanchez Altunaga v. Warden of Central Valley Annex Detention Facility
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Dale A. Drozd (Barack Obama, 2015)
Date Decided
2026-11-20
Docket No.
1:26-cv-07725
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration detention, habeas corpus, temporary restraining order, Laken Riley Act, mandatory detention, in forma pauperis

Background

Moises Sanchez Altunaga, a Cuban national proceeding pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition on September 21, 2026, challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He simultaneously moved to proceed in forma pauperis, for appointment of counsel, and for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release. The court set a TRO briefing schedule and asked the government to distinguish the court's prior detention decisions.

The court found that petitioner entered the United States without inspection or parole around August 2020, was placed in removal proceedings and released, and was later detained after a 2022 criminal arrest before obtaining a $5,000 immigration bond. On June 28, 2026, Florida police arrested him on a misdemeanor petit larceny charge under Florida Statute § 812.014 that remained pending, and immigration agents re-detained him the same day with an I-200 warrant. The government's evidence did not show that he received advance notice or a Form I-286 custody determination at re-detention.

The Court’s Holding

The court held that the Laken Riley Act's amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) applied because petitioner's June 28, 2026 arrest postdated the Act's January 29, 2025 enactment, and the pending state criminal charge meant this was not a case involving only an arrest without charges. It therefore found petitioner subject to mandatory detention.

The absence of advance notice or a custody determination before re-detention did not require a hearing because the statute mandates immediate custody and neither petitioner nor the court identified contrary authority. Petitioner's lawful-entry argument failed because he alleged no lawful entry and the government showed unlawful entry, and his prolonged-detention argument failed because detention had lasted well under the presumptively reasonable six months described in Zadvydas v. Davis.

Because petitioner did not show a likelihood of success on the merits, the court denied both TRO motions without prejudice without reaching the remaining Winter factors. It granted in forma pauperis status, denied the reply request as moot, and referred the pending habeas petition to Magistrate Judge Sean C. Riordan for further proceedings. The order did not expressly rule on petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel.

Key Takeaways

  • A pending state theft or larceny charge can trigger mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) when the arrest occurred after the Laken Riley Act's enactment.
  • The court distinguished cases applying the Act only where an arrest was later followed by criminal charges, finding the pending Florida charge sufficient here.
  • Failure to provide advance notice or a Form I-286 before re-detention did not defeat mandatory detention on this record.
  • A TRO movant's failure to show likely success allowed the court to skip the other Winter factors.
  • The habeas petition itself remained pending and was referred to a magistrate judge; the order resolved only interim relief and fee status, and did not expressly rule on the counsel motion.

Why It Matters

This order illustrates how the Laken Riley Act expands mandatory immigration detention based on qualifying pending state charges, while leaving the underlying habeas challenge for later proceedings.

It also confirms that courts may deny emergency release relief at the threshold merits stage without deciding the remaining equitable factors, and that lack of pre-detention paperwork alone did not establish a right to a bond hearing under § 1226(c). The order left the motion for appointment of counsel unresolved.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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