Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Marlon Mauricio Funes Garcia, a 39-year-old Honduran citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2024 and was placed in expedited removal proceedings. After expressing a credible fear of return, he was referred to removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and released on parole on March 4, 2024, to pursue asylum. Garcia settled in the San Francisco Bay Area, filed an asylum application, attended all immigration court hearings, and complied with all required ICE check-ins for over two years.
In August 2026, Garcia was charged with insurance fraud in San Mateo County Superior Court but was not arrested or convicted. On September 17, 2026, he attended a regularly scheduled ICE check-in and was re-arrested and detained by respondents. Garcia filed a habeas petition and request for a temporary restraining order, arguing his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process, substantive due process, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted a TRO and consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with final disposition of the petition.
The Court’s Holding
The court held it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear Garcia's constitutional challenge to his parole revocation and re-detention. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in Padilla v. ICE (2026), the court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(e)(2) do not bar judicial review of constitutional challenges to the statute itself, as opposed to challenges to individual determinations made under § 1225(b)(1). The court distinguished Thuraissigiam, where the petitioner challenged the correctness of his credible-fear determination.
On the merits, the court found Garcia had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his continued release after over two years on parole, citing Pinchi v. Noem and Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found all three factors favored Garcia: (1) his private interest in freedom from restraint was salient given his established community ties, family, and employment; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation was high because respondents never showed he was a flight risk or danger to the community—pending charges without arrest or conviction were insufficient; and (3) the government's interest in post-detention rather than pre-detention hearings was negligible, with the administrative burden of a pre-detention hearing de minimis compared to detention costs. The court granted the writ and permanently enjoined re-detention unless respondents provide a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge with seven days' notice, at which the government must prove flight risk or dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.
Key Takeaways
- The court has jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to immigration detention statutes even where statutory jurisdiction-stripping provisions would otherwise bar review of individual removal determinations.
- A noncitizen released on parole for over two years who has established community ties, family, and employment possesses a protected liberty interest in continued release under the Fifth Amendment.
- Pending criminal charges alone—without arrest, conviction, or a showing of dangerousness or flight risk—are insufficient to justify re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing.
- Due process requires a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge at which the government bears the burden of proving flight risk or dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.
- The government's administrative and fiscal burden in providing a pre-detention hearing is de minimis compared to the costs of detention.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Ninth Circuit district court precedent holding that statutory jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do not preclude habeas review of constitutional challenges to the government's authority to revoke parole and re-detain individuals who have been released for extended periods. The ruling aligns with Padilla v. ICE, Noori v. LaRose, and a line of Northern District of California cases recognizing that prolonged release on parole creates a vested liberty interest triggering Mathews v. Eldridge protections. By requiring a pre-detention hearing with a heightened burden of proof on the government, the order imposes a significant procedural safeguard against erroneous or arbitrary re-detention of asylum seekers with established community ties.