Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Maria De La Luz Marin, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 12, 2026, while detained at the Adelanto Detention Center. On August 24, 2026, Respondents filed a notice of intended removal and a response to the petition. On August 25, 2026, the District Judge issued an order enjoining Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing Marin outside the Central District of California pending final resolution of the case or further order of the Court. On September 10, 2026, Marin filed an amended petition, and on September 11, 2026, the District Judge approved her consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
The amended petition raised three claims: that Marin's re-detention violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment, that it violated substantive due process, and that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Respondents answered on September 21, 2026, and Marin replied on October 6, 2026. In their answer, Respondents stated that Marin was subject to a final order of removal, that she had previously been removed in 2010, 2014, 2015, and 2019, and that they had served her with a copy of the notice of intended removal on August 17, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in the amended petition or otherwise impede the government's removal of Marin. The court explained that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), no court has jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim arising from the government's decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rauda v. Jennings, the court held that Section 1252(g) strips district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to the execution of a removal order, no matter how the petitioner frames the claim.
The court reviewed the framework governing post-removal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and Zadvydas v. Davis, which presumptively limits post-removal-order detention to six months unless removal remains reasonably foreseeable, but found that once the government has commenced execution of a removal order, a district court is without jurisdiction to intervene. Given the undisputed facts that Marin was subject to a final removal order and that Respondents had filed and served a notice of intended removal, the court concluded that any ruling in her favor would unduly interfere with the government's ability to effectuate removal. The court therefore dismissed the amended petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- A district court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to interfere with the government's execution of a final removal order, even when the petitioner raises constitutional due process challenges to continued detention.
- The Ninth Circuit's decision in Rauda v. Jennings holds that Section 1252(g) bars any challenge to the discretionary decision to execute a removal order no matter how the petitioner frames it.
- The dismissal was without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, so the court did not reach the merits of Marin's due process or Administrative Procedure Act claims.
- The Zadvydas framework governing prolonged post-removal detention does not apply once the government has commenced execution of the removal order.
- Marin was subject to a final removal order and had been removed four times previously when the government filed its notice of intended removal in August 2026.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the broad jurisdictional bar that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) poses to habeas petitioners seeking release from immigration detention once the government has begun executing a removal order. Even claims framed as constitutional due process violations cannot overcome the statute's jurisdictional strip when the relief sought would interfere with removal.
The decision applies the Ninth Circuit's reading in Rauda v. Jennings that Section 1252(g) applies squarely to enforcement of long-standing removal orders, limiting the avenues available to detained noncitizens who face imminent removal after extended detention.