Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Luis Fernando Lopez-Ruiz, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection around 1999. His application for Temporary Protected Status was denied in 2007, and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Honduras in absentia on July 10, 2010. He was arrested and physically removed to Honduras about two years later but returned to the United States without inspection that same year. On May 16, 2026, Miami police pulled him over for driving with an expired license, arrested him, and transferred him to ICE custody. An immigration detainer was issued that day, and the case was processed on May 18, 2026.
Lopez-Ruiz filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 20, 2026, challenging the lawfulness of his ICE detention. He argued that his detention violated the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis and that his warrantless arrest violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). The government responded that removal was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, that no warrant was required because he was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) rather than § 1226(a), and that an administrative warrant had in fact been issued on the day of his arrest.
The Court’s Holding
The court first addressed the Zadvydas claim and found that the government had rebutted any showing that removal was not reasonably foreseeable. ICE had already allocated a seat on a removal flight to Honduras departing October 12, 2026, and only held off because of the court's own order to show cause enjoining removal during the proceedings. Multiple removal flights to Honduras operate weekly, and the government appeared to have secured the necessary travel documents. The court therefore concluded that removal was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future and moved on to the warrantless-arrest argument.
On the central issue, the court held that immigration officers making warrantless arrests must comply with § 1357(a)(2) regardless of whether the detainee is held under § 1231(a) or § 1226(a). The court further found that because Lopez-Ruiz had a final removal order, the applicable regulations required a Form I-205 warrant of removal, not the Form I-200 warrant of arrest that ICE actually used. The warrant was therefore invalid. Turning to whether the warrantless arrest was independently justified, the court found it was not: the government offered no evidence that officers had reason to believe Lopez-Ruiz was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained, and in fact officers encountered him while he was already in jail. Because the arrest did not comply with § 1357(a)(2), the court granted the petition and ordered respondents to immediately release Lopez-Ruiz from custody.
Key Takeaways
- A final removal order does not give ICE blanket authority to arrest without a warrant; officers must still satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
- Once removal proceedings are complete and a final administrative removal order exists, the governing regulations require a Form I-205 warrant of removal, not a Form I-200 warrant of arrest.
- To justify a warrantless immigration arrest, the government must show reason to believe the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained, and encountering the person while already in jail undercuts any such claim.
- The court did not reach the question of whether officers had reason to believe Lopez-Ruiz was unlawfully present, because the failure to show likelihood of escape was dispositive.
- The Zadvydas claim failed because the government demonstrated that removal to Honduras was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, with a seat already allocated on a scheduled flight.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that the statutory authority to detain under § 1231(a) does not subsume or eliminate the separate warrant requirements for arrest. Courts in multiple districts have reached similar conclusions, and this ruling adds to a growing body of case law holding ICE accountable to the regulatory framework governing which type of warrant applies at each stage of removal proceedings.
The ruling also underscores that the likelihood-of-escape requirement in § 1357(a)(2) is not a formality. Where a person is already in custody on other charges, the government faces a steep challenge in arguing that the individual might escape before a warrant could be obtained.