Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Juan Antonio Lemus Menjivar, who is representing himself, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of California on October 29, 2026. The petition names the Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary, Markweyne Mullin, as respondents. According to the order, he has been in immigration detention since October 17, 2026, and he alleges that he was detained without due process. Those are the petitioner's allegations as summarized by the court; the order makes no finding on whether they are true or whether the detention is lawful.
The order issued on November 2, 2026, days after filing, before any response from the government and before any ruling on the merits. The court did not address the underlying detention claims. It considered only whether the petitioner should have a lawyer while the case proceeds. It reasoned that the complexity of the constitutional, statutory, and procedural issues presented meant that representation would serve the interests of justice, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) and Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). The order is a short case-management ruling by a single district judge.
The Court’s Holding
The court conditionally appointed Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. to represent the petitioner, effective immediately. The appointment is conditional because financial eligibility has not yet been shown. The court ordered the petitioner to submit a CJA 23 financial affidavit by November 9, 2026, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) and Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 1990).
The order also builds in an exit. If Federal Defenders determines that the petitioner is not financially eligible, or that it lacks the capability to represent him, it must notify the petitioner and file notice with the court by November 9, 2026, and the petitioner then continues without counsel. If Federal Defenders accepts the representation, the petitioner may file an amended petition no later than November 16, 2026. That deadline sets an optional filing; the order does not itself amend or dismiss anything.
Finally, to preserve the court's jurisdiction while the matter is pending, the court directed that the petitioner not be removed from the Southern District of California unless and until the court orders otherwise. It supported this status-quo directive with district court decisions and with the Supreme Court's statement in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 97 (2025), that federal courts have power to issue injunctive relief to prevent irreparable harm and preserve jurisdiction. The order does not rule on a motion for a temporary restraining order, does not set a hearing, and does not decide whether the court has jurisdiction over the claims or whether release or any other relief is warranted. Those questions remain open.
Key Takeaways
- The order appoints counsel only conditionally; the appointment depends on the petitioner establishing financial eligibility through a CJA 23 affidavit due November 9, 2026.
- Federal Defenders may decline if it finds the petitioner ineligible or lacks the capability to represent him, and it must give notice to the petitioner and the court by November 9, 2026, after which the petitioner would proceed without counsel.
- If Federal Defenders accepts, the petitioner may file an amended petition by November 16, 2026, which is permission and not a requirement.
- The court barred removal of the petitioner from the district until further order, a preservation measure that does not decide the merits.
- The claim of detention without due process is an allegation; nothing in the order finds the detention lawful or unlawful.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates how the Southern District of California handles newly filed immigration-detention habeas petitions from unrepresented detainees: it moves quickly to secure counsel and, at the same time, keeps the petitioner within the district so the court is not deprived of the ability to hear the case. Appointment under the Criminal Justice Act's discretionary provision turns on the interests of justice, and the court's stated reason here was the complexity of the legal issues.
The ruling carries limited precedential weight. It is a brief, case-specific order by a district judge that resolves no merits question. Practitioners should treat it as an example of procedure and not as authority on the lawfulness of the petitioner's detention. What remains open includes whether counsel will actually be appointed, whether an amended petition will be filed, the respondents' response, and the ultimate disposition of the petition.