Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Ksenia Raya Jacobs, proceeding pro se, entered the United States on humanitarian parole in November 2022 and was granted asylum in August 2024. On December 4, 2024, she filed Form I-485 to adjust status to permanent resident. USCIS issued a request for initial evidence in February 2025, to which plaintiff responded by May 2025. Since then, plaintiff alleges USCIS has taken no further adjudicative action, issued no additional requests for evidence, scheduled no interview, and rendered no decision on her application.
Plaintiff filed this action in March 2026 asserting a single claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for unreasonable delay. Defendants moved to dismiss in June 2026, arguing lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and failure to state a claim. In July 2026, plaintiff moved for leave to amend solely to elaborate on allegations that the delay caused significant hardship and uncertainty, including medical conditions and employment authorization concerns. The magistrate judge considered both motions on the papers.
The Court’s Holding
The court first rejected defendants' jurisdictional argument. While 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of individual discretionary decisions, it does not strip jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of policies and processes governing discretionary decisions, including unreasonable delay claims that do not seek review of a rendered decision. Following Komma v. Edlow and Behdin v. Edlow, the court found jurisdiction proper over plaintiff's APA claim challenging processing delay rather than a final adjudication.
On the merits, the court applied the six TRAC factors and concluded plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. The application has been pending less than two years, and case law consistently holds that delays of four to five years or more in the immigration context are not unreasonable. The first TRAC factor (rule of reason) weighs heavily for defendants. The second factor is neutral because 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b)'s 180-day processing goal is non-binding legislative dicta. The third and fifth factors (human health/welfare and prejudice) favor defendants because plaintiff resides and works in the U.S. without fear of removal, and her alleged hardships—anxiety, insomnia, IBS flare, USMLE preparation delays, and EAD gaps—are legally insufficient compared to applicants awaiting adjudication abroad in dangerous conditions. The fourth factor favors defendants because expediting one application merely delays others. The sixth factor is neutral absent bad faith allegations. Even if factors three and five favored plaintiff, the delay cannot be unreasonable at this stage.
The court recommends dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because the proposed amendments only add factual allegations about hardship that have been considered and found legally insufficient, and the claim lacks merit entirely.
Key Takeaways
- A delay of less than two years in adjudicating an I-485 application does not constitute unreasonable delay under the APA as a matter of law in the Ninth Circuit.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar jurisdiction over APA unreasonable delay claims that challenge processing policies rather than individual discretionary decisions.
- The 180-day processing timeline in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) is non-binding 'sense of Congress' language and does not create a mandatory timetable for TRAC factor two.
- Hardships such as anxiety, medical conditions, career delays, and employment authorization gaps—while sympathetic—do not establish that human health or welfare are at stake when the applicant remains in the U.S. with work authorization and without removal risk.
- Leave to amend may be denied when proposed amendments only elaborate on hardship allegations that are legally insufficient to satisfy the TRAC factors.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar for APA unreasonable delay claims in the immigration context within the Eastern District of California, aligning with a broader trend of courts requiring multi-year delays—often five years or more—before finding agency action unreasonable. It clarifies that jurisdictional bars on reviewing discretionary decisions do not extend to systemic delay challenges, preserving a narrow path for judicial review of agency processing timelines.
The ruling also underscores that personal hardship, absent extraordinary circumstances such as physical danger in a foreign country, will not accelerate adjudication when the applicant already enjoys lawful presence and work authorization.