Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pedro Juan Jimenez, a noncitizen, has been held at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center since May 13, 2026. The government issued a Notice to Appear charging him as removable for being present without admission or parole, and a Form I-213 reflects a criminal history that includes two misdemeanor convictions. In immigration court he denied the allegations and the charge of removability. His July 31, 2026 motion to suppress, which argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, was denied. After an August 18, 2026 bond hearing, the immigration judge denied bond, finding he had not met his burden to show he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk.
On October 21, 2026, Jimenez, represented by counsel, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He alleged a Fourth Amendment violation, a Fifth Amendment due process violation based on involuntary statements to agents, violations of 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.5 and 287.8, and a due process violation in the bond denial. On the regulations, he alleged that agents detained him before having reason to believe he was a noncitizen, seized him without reasonable suspicion, and coerced him. These were allegations, and the court did not resolve them. Respondents answered on October 29, and Jimenez replied on November 2. Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver issued the unpublished in-chambers order on November 2, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition to the extent it sought release based on the Fourth Amendment claim. It reasoned that the remedy for an unlawful arrest is suppression of evidence, not release from custody. It read the involuntary-statements claim as apparently a challenge to the denial of the suppression motion, said the remedy for any error lies in an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and was not persuaded the claim is cognizable in habeas. It cited Lopez-Mendoza, which declined to apply the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings, and the Ninth Circuit's exception for egregious cases, and found no showing that the exception applied. On the regulatory claims, it did not resolve the factual allegations because defects in an original arrest do not entitle a detainee to discharge.
On bond, the court noted that courts generally lack jurisdiction over discretionary bond decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). It reviewed the constitutional challenge for abuse of discretion, which asks whether the immigration judge applied the correct legal standard. Under Martinez v. Clark, the government should have borne the burden of proving danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. Because the immigration judge placed the burden on Jimenez, the court found an abuse of discretion and a due process violation. It rejected the government's reliance on Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland because that case involved a second bond hearing, not an initial one. It waived exhaustion because the error is apparent on the face of the ruling and an administrative appeal would prolong detention.
The court granted relief only in part. Respondents must provide a new bond hearing within 10 days at which they bear the burden of establishing danger or flight risk. Jimenez and his attorney must receive at least two days' notice. Respondents must file a notice of compliance within 14 days reporting the outcome. The court considered but rejected release, noting that the petition said little about his length of residence or family, work, or community ties, and that the Form I-213 shows a criminal history.
Key Takeaways
- In this order, unlawful-arrest theories under the Fourth Amendment and 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.5 and 287.8 did not support habeas release, because the remedy for arrest defects is not discharge from custody.
- Challenges to the denial of a suppression motion in removal proceedings were directed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the court was not persuaded they are cognizable in habeas absent a showing of egregious circumstances.
- Placing the burden of proof on the detainee at an initial bond hearing was treated as an abuse of discretion and a due process violation, with the government required to meet a clear and convincing standard.
- Exhaustion was waived because the legal error was facial and further administrative proceedings would extend detention, but the remedy was a new hearing rather than release.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order and is not binding precedent. It is a useful example of how Central District judges are separating arrest-based claims, which do not yield release, from bond-hearing defects, which can yield a new hearing. It applies Martinez v. Clark to put the burden on the government at an initial hearing and distinguishes Rodriguez Diaz as a second-hearing case.
Much remains open. The order does not decide the regulatory allegations or the merits of removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals remains the forum for the suppression ruling. It does not decide whether Jimenez should ultimately be released, because that depends on the new hearing and the notice of compliance.