Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Edgar Alonso Iglesias-Ahumada, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested on July 13, 2026, and charged with passport fraud and aggravated identity theft. After release on bond in the criminal case, he was taken into immigration custody and moved to an ICE holding facility. The order recites that he was interviewed and issued a reinstated removal order on July 23, 2026, and places the transfer on July 24, 2026, without explaining that sequence.
In his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner alleged that he was held in a freezing cell and woken repeatedly overnight to sign paperwork he was told he had no choice but to sign, and that he later learned one document was a voluntary departure agreement. These are his allegations; the court made no findings on them. He asserted claims for a coerced and involuntary waiver, denial of a fear screening, and unlawful detention under the mandatory detention framework. He asked the court to declare his signature on the voluntary departure document void, to order a fear screening interview and access to an immigration judge before further removal proceedings, or alternatively to order release unless a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) was held within seven days.
Respondents argued that the reinstated removal order is administratively final and that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) requires mandatory detention for 90 days. Petitioner filed no traverse.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Linda Lopez denied the petition without prejudice. The court explained that when a final removal order exists, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) requires detention during a 90-day removal period. After that period, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), limits detention to a period reasonably necessary to accomplish removal. Zadvydas treats six months of post-removal detention as presumptively reasonable, and after that point the detainee must give good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future before the burden shifts to the government.
Applying that framework, the court observed that although Petitioner disputes the circumstances in which he signed the voluntary departure paperwork, it is undisputed that a final removal order is pending. It found him still within the 90-day window of mandatory detention and concluded that his current detention violates neither Zadvydas nor the Due Process Clause. It cited Khalilova v. Smith, a Southern District of California decision, as finding a habeas petition premature when six months had not passed.
As to the requested relief, the court stated that Petitioner cited no authority, and it was aware of none, that would authorize the declaration, fear screening, or bond hearing he sought in these circumstances. A footnote noted that he had not indicated that he sought a stay of removal, a motion to reopen, or similar relief in immigration court, and that he had not shown this court has jurisdiction over his challenge to the voluntary departure form. The court did not decide whether that signature was knowing and voluntary.
Key Takeaways
- A detainee held under a final removal order who is still within the 90-day removal period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) faces statutorily mandated detention, and this court found no Zadvydas or due process violation at that stage.
- Because the six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas had not run, the court treated the detention challenge as premature, citing Khalilova, and denied the petition without prejudice.
- Allegations that voluntary departure paperwork was signed under coercive conditions did not change the result, because the court saw no authority for the requested relief while a final removal order remained in place.
- The court made no findings on the coercion allegations or on whether the departure document was voluntary, and it did not grant a fear screening or bond hearing. Those questions remain unresolved.
- In federal habeas, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and Petitioner filed no traverse to respond to the government's return.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, so it carries no binding precedential weight, and it rests on a short record in which the petitioner did not file a traverse. Its main value is as an example of how a Southern District of California judge applies the 90-day and six-month Zadvydas structure to a person recently placed in custody on a reinstated removal order.
Because the denial is without prejudice and the case was closed, nothing in the order bars Petitioner from seeking relief later, for example if detention continues past the presumptively reasonable period, or by pursuing relief in immigration proceedings. The order leaves open whether a departure form signed under the alleged conditions is valid and which forum may hear that challenge.