Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Terrell Kevin Hester, a state prisoner at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer and in forma pauperis. His defendants were the CDCR Secretary, the prison warden, and Doe defendants. He alleges that a CDCR classification committee added an R suffix, a sex offender designation, to his custody classification in November 2009, and that an auditor approved it in April 2010. According to documents he attached, the suffix was applied because he had been charged with rape, although the charge was dismissed before trial.
He alleges that at an annual classification hearing on May 14, 2025, the Doe defendants refused to let him present an autopsy report that he says showed no evidence of rape. He also alleges they gave no written statement of the evidence relied on or of the reasons for keeping the suffix. He further alleges the suffix affects his parole eligibility because the parole board requires him to admit a rape he denies and to complete a victim-impact class. He sought an injunction to remove the suffix and compensatory damages. These are his allegations, and the court did not find them true. The court had dismissed his original complaint on July 27, 2026 for failure to state a claim, and he then filed a First Amended Complaint.
The Court’s Holding
The court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), applying the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Relying on Sandin v. Conner and Neal v. Shimoda, the court explained that a sex offender label implicates due process when it is coupled with atypical and significant hardship, such as mandatory treatment that is a precondition to parole eligibility. An inmate who has never been convicted of a sex offense and never had an adversarial chance to challenge the label is entitled to written notice of the reasons and a hearing at which he may call witnesses and present evidence.
The court found that the plaintiff's own filings showed he received that process. He had the May 14, 2025 hearing, and the written statement he attached to both his original and amended complaints explained the decision. That statement said the suffix was imposed based on the police report and district attorney comments under Title 15, section 3377.1(b)(5). It said the suffix was kept because the charge was dismissed before trial rather than resulting in an acquittal, so the regulations still allowed its use, and that the committee reviewed the totality of the circumstances. Because the rape charge was enough to apply the suffix, the court held officials did not have to consider the autopsy report. It cited Wolff v. McDonnell, which lets officials disregard evidence for reasons such as irrelevance or lack of necessity.
On leave to amend, the court acknowledged that pro se complaints ordinarily get another chance unless the defects clearly cannot be cured. It concluded amendment would be futile because the plaintiff had repeatedly shown he received all the process the federal Constitution requires. The amended complaint was dismissed without further leave to amend, and the Clerk was directed to close the case. The order does not say whether the dismissal is with prejudice. It addresses only federal procedural due process and does not decide any other theory.
Key Takeaways
- A sex offender label alone does not trigger due process protection. It must be coupled with atypical and significant hardship, such as mandatory treatment tied to parole eligibility.
- For an inmate never convicted of a sex offense, the court described Neal v. Shimoda as requiring written notice of the reasons and a hearing with an opportunity to present evidence.
- The court held that a hearing plus a written statement of reasons satisfied the federal process requirement here. It also held officials need not consider evidence offered to dispute a charge that the regulation treats as sufficient on its own.
- A screening court may rely on exhibits the plaintiff himself attached, and here they supported dismissal without further leave to amend as futile.
- This is an unpublished district-court screening order. The allegations were not found true, and the order carries no precedential weight.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished, single-judge screening order. It binds no other court and applies existing Ninth Circuit authority rather than announcing new law. Its value is mainly illustrative of how Neal v. Shimoda and Wolff are applied at the pleading stage.
In practical terms, the order shows that a prisoner challenging an R suffix based on a dismissed charge may fail at screening if his own exhibits show a hearing and written reasons. The order does not decide whether keeping the suffix was correct under state law or whether any other claim could be brought. It ends this action in the Southern District of California, and it does not discuss appeal rights.