Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Nehomar Alejandro Hernandez Sequera, an immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, petitioned the Eastern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention at the California City Immigration Processing Center. The order indicates he was detained in May 2026. The petition was referred to a magistrate judge, who on October 6, 2026 recommended that it be granted on statutory grounds and that Petitioner be released. The parties had seven days to object.
Respondent objected the same day. It argued that statutory relief was improper because Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), having been paroled into the United States at the border. It added that if release were ordered, it must rest on the Due Process Clause alone. Because Petitioner is pro se and the court intended to grant the relief he sought, the court did not wait for his objections, reasoning that waiting would only delay that relief.
The Court’s Holding
The district judge adopted the findings and recommendations only in part. The court presumed the factual findings correct and reviewed the legal conclusions de novo. It found the recommendations supported by the record and the magistrate judge's analysis, but chose to resolve the case on due process grounds. A footnote explains that, having granted the petition on that basis, the court need not address the other grounds raised.
The court relied on its own earlier decisions holding that the Due Process Clause requires a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, at which the noncitizen's bond eligibility is considered, before the government may re-detain a person previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). It cited Selis Tinoco v. Noem, Labrador-Prato v. Noem, D.L.C. v. Wofford, and Altin v. Chestnut. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner was paroled into the country and that his circumstances fall within the category in which the court typically finds a due process liberty interest. Respondent identified no factual or legal difference from those decisions, so the court saw no basis to reject release as the remedy.
The petition was granted as to the due process claim. Petitioner must be released immediately on the same conditions that applied before his May 2026 detention, with no added restriction, such as electronic monitoring, unless a future pre-deprivation hearing finds it necessary. Respondent must return his identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card and other possessions, and must file a notice of compliance within three days. Any re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. The order expressly does not address detention if Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of it. The clerk was directed to enter judgment for Petitioner and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted habeas relief on due process grounds alone and did not decide the statutory theory the magistrate judge recommended or Respondent's § 1225(b)(2)(A) argument.
- Release is immediate and on the pre-detention conditions, and no added restriction such as electronic monitoring may be imposed unless a future hearing finds it necessary.
- Any re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter who considers bond eligibility.
- Respondent must return Petitioner's identification and other documents and file a notice of compliance within three days.
- The order leaves open the government's authority to detain Petitioner if he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal.
Why It Matters
The order applies a rule this court has stated in earlier cases, several of them rulings on temporary restraining orders, to a final grant of habeas relief. It shows the court treating the rule as settled when the government identifies no facts that set the case apart. It also shows how a court can avoid a contested statutory question, here whether a paroled entrant is detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), by resting on the Constitution once the government itself says due process is the only available basis for relief.
This is a single district judge's order in a now-closed case, and nothing in the materials indicates it is published. It does not bind other courts, and its reach is limited to Petitioner. Its reasoning rests on the court's prior decisions rather than a new analysis. The statutory question and detention following a final removal order both remain undecided.