Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, identified in the order by initials, is an asylum seeker who entered the United States on November 25, 2017, with his then three-year-old son. Government records show they were initially processed for expedited removal, but their cases were changed to notices to appear and they were released on humanitarian parole the next day. The record is unclear whether he was later re-detained, but on June 20, 2019, DHS issued him an order of release on recognizance under section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner's filings state that he lived in Florida for about eight years, ran a janitorial business, obtained work authorization and a driver's license, paid taxes, attended immigration court, completed annual ICE reporting, and has a United States citizen daughter. A second notice to appear issued in August 2024, and an immigration judge closed that case for failure to prosecute. The record reflects no criminal history.
On May 28, 2026, Florida Highway Patrol officers stopped Petitioner while he drove to work and arrested him for immigration violations. ICE took custody and issued a notice to appear with the 'arriving alien' box checked. An immigration judge denied a custody redetermination, concluding that regulation barred it because DHS had designated him an arriving alien. He was transferred to California City in the Eastern District of California. After a pro se filing, he obtained counsel and filed a First Amended Petition claiming violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment. Respondents argued that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) because he had been released on parole, and that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition. It first declined to require prudential exhaustion, reasoning that an administrative appellate record was unnecessary, that deliberate-bypass concerns were reduced, and that the agency was unlikely to correct its own mistake, so denying relief pending a Board of Immigration Appeals appeal would be futile and delay vindication of his rights. On the statute, the court held that section 1225(b)(1) reaches people who have not been admitted or paroled, and Petitioner was paroled in 2017, placing him outside its express terms. The record showed standard removal proceedings governed by section 1226(a): the 2017 I-213 recording that ICE declined to detain and converted the cases to notices to appear, the 2019 release under section 236, and an I-200 warrant. The court called Respondents' assertion that the 2019 release was an error unsupported by evidence and an obvious post hoc rationalization. Detention of about five months without a bond hearing therefore violated the INA.
On due process, the court found a protected liberty interest. It treated the government's releases as an implicit promise that he would not be re-detained while he abided by the release terms, and noted that Respondents did not dispute his compliance. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, it found a weighty private interest, a high risk of erroneous deprivation because Respondents did not argue danger or flight risk, and a low government interest because notice and custody hearings are routine under section 1226(a). Due process required notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before detention, which he did not receive.
The order requires immediate release on the conditions in place before the May 28, 2026 arrest, return of his documents and possessions, and a compliance notice within two court days. Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining him while he is subject to section 1226(a) unless they comply with statutory and constitutional protections. Those include at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral factfinder, where the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that no alternative to detention can mitigate danger or flight risk; counsel may attend. The temporary restraining order and expedited-ruling motions were denied as moot, and the clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the case. The order addresses custody only, not the merits of removal or asylum.
Key Takeaways
- The court read section 1225(b)(1) as inapplicable to a person who was paroled into the United States, so that provision could not support mandatory detention of this petitioner.
- Where the agency's own records showed standard removal proceedings, the court refused to credit an unsupported litigation assertion that an earlier release was a mistake.
- Years of compliant release can give a noncitizen a protected liberty interest, and the court held that re-detention here required notice and a pre-deprivation hearing.
- The re-detention injunction is conditional: Respondents may seek detention again only after seven days' notice and a hearing in which they bear a clear-and-convincing burden.
Why It Matters
This is a district court release order and is not a reported or precedential decision, so it is persuasive only. It draws on other Eastern District of California and Northern District of California rulings and is another example of courts testing mandatory-detention theories against the administrative record.
Because the court applied the Mathews factors to this petitioner's particular facts, including the length of his release, family ties, lack of criminal history and the absence of any claim of danger or flight risk, its pre-detention hearing and burden-of-proof rulings may not extend to materially different cases.