Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ramon Gonzalez Elias, an immigration detainee representing himself, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because the petition pleaded no factual background, the magistrate judge took the history from his earlier habeas case. Per that summary, he is a Mexican citizen who entered without inspection near Lukeville, Arizona on or about February 11, 2024, received a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility, and was released on his own recognizance. ICE arrested him on October 22, 2025. The summary also notes a lengthy criminal history.
His first petition, filed March 6, 2026, was granted on April 2, 2026 over Respondents' argument that detention was mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The court ordered a Singh v. Holder bond hearing at which the government must show danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. An immigration judge held that hearing on April 21, 2026 and denied bond. Petitioner's second petition, filed June 5, 2026, alleged that continued detention violates due process and Zadvydas because removal is not reasonably foreseeable, and that Respondents' third-country removal policy violates due process, the INA, the Convention Against Torture, and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
The Court’s Holding
The court first identified the governing statute. Petitioner used a form for people with final removal orders and said he was ordered removed in December 2025. The court's check of the Executive Office for Immigration Review's online case information showed a removal order dated August 31, 2026 and a Board of Immigration Appeals appeal, received September 10, 2026, still pending. With no administratively final order, the removal period has not begun, so detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1231. The court noted it had previously rejected the § 1225(b) theory.
The magistrate judge recommended rejecting the due process arguments. To the extent Petitioner raised a procedural challenge to prolonged detention, Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), upheld § 1226(a) against a facial challenge and denied a second bond hearing to a detainee held over fourteen months after his first, and Petitioner had not shown his case was distinguishable. On his reply argument that EOIR's institutional changes preclude impartial bond adjudication, the court applied the standard quoted from an unpublished Ninth Circuit disposition, Mata-Yanez v. Bondi, and, citing a district court decision, found no evidence of bias by the immigration judge in his own proceeding.
The disposition is a recommendation that the petition be denied; no judgment has been entered. The district judge will review it. Objections of up to fifteen pages are due within fourteen days of service, with replies fourteen days after objections, and failure to object may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Separately, the magistrate judge denied the motion for appointment of counsel as an order, reasoning that because relief was not warranted Petitioner had not shown the likelihood of success that would make counsel necessary in the interests of justice. The findings do not separately analyze the Zadvydas or third-country policy claims.
Key Takeaways
- A pending Board of Immigration Appeals appeal means no administratively final removal order exists, so the court treated detention as governed by § 1226(a) rather than § 1231.
- The court read Rodriguez Diaz as defeating a procedural due process claim for a second bond hearing unless the detainee shows his case is distinguishable.
- A claim of institutional bias at EOIR needs evidence of bias by the immigration judge in the particular proceeding.
- Because this is a magistrate judge's recommendation, the petition remains pending until the district judge rules on it and on any objections.
- The motion for counsel was denied because of the recommended denial of relief, and the findings did not separately decide the Zadvydas or third-country claims.
Why It Matters
This unpublished magistrate judge recommendation has no precedential weight and is not a final judgment. It does show how an Eastern District of California court is treating a successive habeas petition from a detainee who already received a court-ordered bond hearing. It also illustrates that the statutory classification turns on whether a removal order is administratively final, and that general attacks on EOIR's independence need case-specific evidence.
What remains open is the district judge's ruling on the recommendation and any objections, and the merits of the Zadvydas and third-country claims, which the findings do not separately address.