Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Edgar Antonio Tovar, an immigration detainee proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued detention. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On September 11, 2026, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations recommending that the petition be granted and that Tovar be released because he could no longer be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) after the recent vacatur of his qualifying crimes, and because his detention would also be improper under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents filed objections on September 14, 2026, arguing that the magistrate judge decided claims not properly before the court, that the § 1226(a) analysis was erroneous because the initial detention was under § 1226(c), and that the proper remedy, if any, was a custody redetermination hearing rather than immediate release.
The Court’s Holding
The district court rejected all three objections and adopted the September 11, 2026 findings and recommendations in full. On the first objection, the court held that the magistrate judge properly liberally construed Tovar's pro se petition, which alleged that his detention continued in violation of law and due process based in part on the April 24, 2026 vacatur of his aggravated felonies under California Penal Code § 1473.7; citing Erickson v. Pardus, the court confirmed that pro se filings are liberally construed and that the petition adequately presented due process relief.
On the second objection, the court agreed that the government's authority to detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) on account of a qualifying crime is invalidated when that crime is vacated under California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1). The court relied on Jaskaran Singh v. Golden State Annex Det. Ctr. and Ninth Circuit authority, including Ballinas-Lucero v. Garland and Bent v. Garland, for the rule that convictions vacated to remedy substantive or procedural defects do not qualify as convictions for immigration purposes. On the third objection, the court held that detention violates due process when the government fails to assert a lawful basis for detention and that the proper remedy is immediate release, citing Jaskaran Singh and Alvarez Maciel v. Noem.
The court therefore granted the petition on due process grounds and ordered that Tovar be released immediately from Respondents' custody under the same conditions he was subject to immediately before his present detention, with no additional restriction such as electronic monitoring unless necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. Respondents must return his documents and possessions, file a notice of compliance within three days, and, if they seek to re-detain him, provide at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which his bond eligibility must be considered. The order expressly does not address detention if Tovar later becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of that order. The Clerk was directed to serve the order on California City Detention Facility, enter judgment for Tovar, and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A conviction vacated under California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) does not qualify as a conviction for immigration purposes and cannot support mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
- When the government's only asserted basis for detention is invalid and no alternative lawful basis is offered, continued detention violates due process and immediate release is the proper remedy rather than a custody redetermination hearing.
- Pro se habeas petitions are liberally construed, so a petition alleging unlawful detention and due process violations based on recently vacated convictions properly presents a due process claim.
- The release order includes procedural protections: before any re-detention, the government must give at least seven days' notice and provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, with bond eligibility considered.
- The order leaves open the separate question whether Respondents may detain Tovar if he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of that order.
Why It Matters
The decision applies settled Ninth Circuit principles to a recurring Eastern District of California scenario: once qualifying convictions are vacated under California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1), § 1226(c) no longer supplies a lawful mandatory-detention predicate, and continued detention without another asserted basis violates due process. By adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations over the government's objections, the court confirms that the remedy in that posture is immediate release, subject to the express carve-out for a future executable final order of removal.