Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Osmany Diaz-Alfonso filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing immigration detention, together with a motion for a temporary restraining order. The petition's first count rested on the court's prior holdings that the Due Process Clause requires the government to provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before re-detaining a noncitizen previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
On September 23, 2026, the court told the parties it was considering ruling directly on the petition and asked whether they opposed simultaneous resolution of the TRO motion and habeas petition. It also directed Respondents to identify any factual or legal issues materially distinguishing the case from its earlier decisions in Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, and D.L.C. Respondents opposed the TRO motion on September 25 but did not distinguish D.L.C., instead arguing that Diaz-Alfonso was apprehended at the border, processed for expedited removal, and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected Respondents' reliance on Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. It explained that the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision in Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement distinguished Thuraissigiam because the due process claim there concerned admission, not detention. Padilla recognized that, apart from the extremely narrow entry-fiction category, every person in the United States receives Fifth Amendment due process protection regardless of citizenship or legal status, and it described admission and detention as fundamentally different legal subjects.
Because Diaz-Alfonso challenged the lawfulness of his present detention rather than his admissibility, the court held that neither Thuraissigiam nor Padilla changed its analysis. Respondents identified no material distinction from the court's prior decisions, so the court granted the TRO motion and the habeas petition as to Count One for the reasons stated in Altin. It did not await a pro se reply because doing so would delay the relief sought, and it did not address additional petition grounds after resolving the due process claim.
The court ordered Diaz-Alfonso's immediate release under the same conditions that applied before his August 6, 2026 detention, with no additional restriction such as electronic monitoring unless found necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. Respondents must return his documents and possessions, file a compliance notice within three days, and give at least seven days' notice plus a neutral-arbiter bond hearing before any re-detention. The order left open detention following an executable final removal order with notice, denied two pending motions as moot, and directed judgment for Petitioner and case closure.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen's challenge to current detention is analytically distinct from a challenge to admissibility, so Thuraissigiam and Padilla did not defeat the detention-based due process claim.
- The government must provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before re-detaining a person covered by the court's prior § 1226(a) and § 1182(d)(5) release rulings.
- The remedy ordered for the absence of a constitutionally compliant hearing was immediate release, restoration of prior conditions, and return of personal documents and possessions.
- Any future re-detention under this order requires at least seven days' notice and a hearing at which bond eligibility must be considered.
- The court resolved only Count One and expressly did not decide other petition grounds or detention circumstances arising after an executable final removal order.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the court's developing detention-due-process framework while incorporating Padilla's distinction between admission and detention. It shows that an expedited-removal processing argument and a broad reading of Thuraissigiam did not establish mandatory detention without the required procedural protections in this case.
Its practical significance lies in the detailed release and compliance directives, including limits on new monitoring conditions and procedural safeguards against renewed detention. At the same time, the order is carefully bounded: it grants relief on the due process count alone and preserves the unresolved question of detention after notice of an executable final removal order.