Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Demmat P., identified by initials in the order, entered the United States on August 11, 2023, and received humanitarian parole through June 12, 2025. He worked as an HVAC specialist, supports his U.S.-citizen wife and stepdaughter, and is the beneficiary of a pending adjustment-of-status application filed by his wife. Local authorities arrested him on February 22, 2026, on a warrant for robbery, aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, and witness tampering charges, and the Broward County prosecutor dismissed them by nolle prosequi on July 30, 2026. ICE arrested him on August 1, 2026, served a Notice to Appear, and transferred him to the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility.
On October 13, 2026, he filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of California challenging his civil detention and seeking release, arguing that holding him without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Respondents answered that he is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and pointed to his criminal history. Because the due process claim sufficed, the court did not reach his Fourth Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act theories.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Judge Troy L. Nunley found a protected liberty interest, which respondents did not dispute. Relying on Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160 (9th Cir. 2026), the court rejected the government's reading of § 1225(b)(2). Mandatory detention under that provision reaches noncitizens entering at the border, while people present without admission who are apprehended in the interior face discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court added that releasing him on humanitarian parole and letting him remain in the community for years strengthened his liberty interest.
Under the three Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the court found a substantial private liberty interest, a significant risk of erroneous deprivation, and a low government burden because notice and custody hearings are routine. It noted he had not received the initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to which he is entitled by statute, citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022). The court said the arrests, tied to an alleged domestic violence incident, could indicate potential danger. It stressed, however, that it was not its role to decide danger or flight risk, and that a hearing would test that question.
The court granted the petition in part. It enjoined respondents from detaining him more than seven days from the order, unless he asks for more time to prepare, without a bond hearing before a neutral factfinder. At that hearing the government must prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, financial circumstances and alternative conditions must be considered, and counsel may attend. If the government fails, release must be immediate. Respondents must file a compliance notice within two court days of the hearing. If he is released, he may not be re-detained under § 1226 absent changed circumstances, at least seven days' notice, and a pre-deprivation hearing under the same standard. The court granted in forma pauperis status, denied the TRO and counsel motions as moot, directed judgment for petitioner, and closed the case, with further detention challenges to be filed under the same case number.
Key Takeaways
- The order does not itself free petitioner; it requires a bond hearing within about a week, and release follows only if the government fails to carry its burden.
- Following Rodriguez Vazquez, the court treated a person present without admission and arrested in the interior as subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
- His arrests did not defeat the right to a hearing; the court left their weight on danger and flight risk to the neutral factfinder.
- If he is released, the government may re-detain him under § 1226 only on changed circumstances, with seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which it bears a clear-and-convincing burden.
- The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act claims were not decided.
Why It Matters
This is a single-case district court order, not a published opinion, and it binds only the parties. Its persuasive weight comes mainly from the Ninth Circuit authority it applies and its Mathews analysis, which other courts in the district may find useful in similar habeas petitions.
Much remains open. No one has yet determined whether he is dangerous or a flight risk, and the order does not resolve his removal proceedings or his pending adjustment application. The order also goes beyond an ordinary bond hearing by placing a clear-and-convincing burden on the government and requiring a pre-deprivation hearing before any re-detention, protections that other courts may or may not adopt.