Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Danny Tshiyoyi Malangu, a citizen and national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, entered the United States on an F1 visa that he overstayed. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested and detained him on December 12, 2025, and removal proceedings were initiated. On June 5, 2026, he received a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which the immigration judge denied custody redetermination after finding he had failed to prove he was not a flight risk. He did not appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Malangu then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contending his detention had become unconstitutionally prolonged. He sought immediate release or, in the alternative, a new individualized bond hearing at which the government would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence and the decisionmaker would consider ability to pay and less restrictive alternatives. After Respondents filed a response on October 7, 2026, Malangu filed a motion for expedited consideration and immediate release on October 20, 2026, which the magistrate judge construed as a traverse.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge first declined to reach Respondents' exhaustion argument, reasoning that Malangu did not challenge the outcome of his bond hearing but instead claimed his detention was unconstitutionally prolonged under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis. The Zadvydas claim was found not cognizable because that decision addresses post-removal-order detention under § 1231, whereas the parties did not dispute that Malangu is detained pre-order under § 1226(a).
On the Fifth Amendment claim, the magistrate judge concluded that compliance with § 1226(a) afforded Malangu all the process he was due. Relying on Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the recommendation held that § 1226(a)'s post-detention bond procedures facially satisfy due process, that no pre-deprivation hearing was required, and that due process did not require a second bond hearing with the government bearing a clear-and-convincing burden even fourteen months after an initial hearing. The magistrate judge found Malangu had not distinguished his case from Rodriguez Diaz, and noted that under Martinez v. Clark the court lacks jurisdiction to reweigh the evidence underlying an immigration judge's bond decision.
The magistrate judge also considered, and rejected on the merits, the new claims raised in the traverse, even though a traverse is not a proper vehicle for additional grounds for relief. The recommendation distinguished recent district decisions ordering release on substantive due process grounds, finding Malangu's conclusory assertions insufficient, and concluded that a pending asylum application and the challenges of pursuing it from detention do not themselves establish a due process violation. The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be denied, subject to a fourteen-day objection period before the assigned district judge.
Key Takeaways
- A magistrate judge in the Eastern District of California recommended denying a § 2241 habeas petition brought by an immigration detainee held pre-removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
- The recommendation held that Zadvydas v. Davis does not apply to pre-order detention under § 1226(a), because that decision governs post-removal-order detention under § 1231.
- Relying on Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the magistrate judge found that § 1226(a)'s post-detention bond procedures facially satisfy due process and that no second bond hearing with a heightened government burden was required.
- The magistrate judge construed the petitioner's motion for expedited consideration as a traverse and addressed its new claims on the merits despite the procedural defect, finding them insufficient to establish a substantive due process violation.
- Because the document is a findings and recommendations rather than a final order, the parties have fourteen days to file objections before the assigned district judge enters judgment.
Why It Matters
The recommendation illustrates how district courts within the Ninth Circuit are applying Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland to reject procedural due process challenges to pre-removal detention under § 1226(a), including requests for second bond hearings at which the government would bear a clear-and-convincing burden. It also underscores the limited role of habeas review of bond decisions, under which courts may assess only whether the immigration judge applied the correct legal standard rather than reweigh the evidence.
The decision further distinguishes between detainees who present concrete, unrebutted evidence of extraordinary circumstances—such as serious medical conditions—and those who offer only conclusory assertions, signaling that substantive due process release claims under § 1226(a) demand specific factual support. As a findings and recommendations, the outcome remains subject to objection and review by the assigned district judge.