Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
DaJuan Huddleston, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action against Khalib and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. On November 5, 2026, he filed a motion for appointment of pro bono counsel (ECF No. 10). He argued that his imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate the case, that the issues are complex and require significant research and investigation, and that he has limited access to the law library and legal knowledge.
The order, issued November 6, 2026, by United States Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean, first lays out the governing legal framework. Huddleston does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, the court explained, citing Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), citing Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel under section 1915(e)(1).
The order further explains that, without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. Quoting Rand, the court noted that to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.
The Court’s Holding
Applying that framework, the court declined to order appointment of pro bono counsel at this time. The court stated that it had reviewed the limited record in the case and was currently unable to make a determination that Huddleston is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. Moreover, the court found, it appears that Huddleston can adequately articulate his claims.
The court advised Huddleston that he is not precluded from renewing his request for appointment of pro bono counsel at a later stage of the proceedings, preserving the possibility of counsel if circumstances change as the case develops.
The operative directive is explicit: "IT IS HERE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of pro bono counsel is DENIED without prejudice." The order denies only the motion for counsel, without prejudice; it does not dismiss or otherwise dispose of the underlying civil rights action.
Key Takeaways
- A prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action has no constitutional right to appointed counsel, and a court cannot compel an attorney to represent him under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
- Under section 1915(e)(1), a court may only request the voluntary assistance of counsel, and only in the most serious and exceptional cases where a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel exists.
- Exceptional circumstances are evaluated under a two-factor test: the likelihood of success on the merits and the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues.
- Here, the court found no exceptional circumstances because, on the limited record, it could not determine that Huddleston is likely to succeed on the merits, and it appeared he can adequately articulate his claims.
- The denial is expressly without prejudice, so Huddleston may renew his request for appointment of pro bono counsel at a later stage of the proceedings.
Why It Matters
The order applies the Ninth Circuit's Rand v. Rowland framework to a pro se prisoner's request for counsel, illustrating that allegations of complex issues, limited law-library access, and the burdens of imprisonment do not by themselves establish exceptional circumstances. The court's inability to assess likelihood of success on a limited record, combined with the plaintiff's apparent ability to articulate his claims, supported the denial at this early stage.
Because the denial is without prejudice and the court expressly advised that the request may be renewed later, the ruling leaves the door open for appointed or volunteer counsel if the merits become clearer or the litigation grows more complex as the case proceeds.