Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Marco Cuenca-Pucha, who represents himself, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a temporary restraining order challenging his ongoing immigration detention. The order refers to the conditions he was under immediately before his detention on August 13, 2026, and the government's opposition treated his earlier release as a parole into the United States. Respondents, including named respondent Tonya Andrews, contend he is in expedited removal proceedings and therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
Count One of the petition raised a due process issue the court had already decided. In Selis Tinoco v. Noem, Labrador-Prato v. Noem, D.L.C. v. Wofford, and Altin v. Chestnut, the court concluded that before the government re-detains a noncitizen previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), the Due Process Clause requires a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the person's eligibility for bond is considered.
On October 6, 2026, the court told the parties it was considering deciding the petition together with the restraining order motion and asked Respondents to identify any factual or legal issue that materially distinguished this case from its earlier orders. Respondents answered on October 8 that the claim would previously have fit those decisions, but that the Ninth Circuit's September 21, 2026 decision in Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement is irreconcilable with them. In their view, the entry fiction doctrine leaves Petitioner entitled to no process beyond what statute provides.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition and the restraining order motion as to Count One and directed entry of judgment for Petitioner. It rejected the Padilla argument. As the court read that decision, the entry fiction operates in an admission case, not a detention case, and admission and detention occupy fundamentally different positions in the legal order: the executive's plenary power over admission does not displace the principle that the government cannot arbitrarily detain people, including noncitizens. The court noted that other courts in the Ninth Circuit, including in the Central District of California and the Western District of Washington, read Padilla the same way. Because Petitioner challenges his present detention rather than his admissibility, Padilla limits only the process owed on admissibility to what statute prescribes and does not affect the detention analysis.
Respondents identified no other distinguishing issue, so the court granted relief for the reasons given in Altin, where it held that immediate release is the proper remedy when the government fails to provide a constitutionally compliant pre-deprivation hearing. The court did not wait for a reply because Respondents did not oppose a simultaneous ruling, Petitioner is pro se, and the relief he sought was being granted. It ordered release on the same conditions that applied before the August 13 detention, with no added restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless later found necessary at a pre-deprivation custody hearing. It also ordered return of his documents and possessions and a notice of compliance within three days. Any re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter who considers bond eligibility.
The court did not reach the petition's other grounds. It also expressly left open the circumstances in which Respondents may detain Petitioner if he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of it.
Key Takeaways
- The court treats Padilla as an admission decision: it limits process on admissibility to what statute provides, but it does not change the due process analysis for detention.
- Respondents' reliance on the entry fiction and on mandatory detention under § 1225(b) did not distinguish this case from the court's earlier re-detention rulings.
- The remedy for the missing pre-deprivation hearing was immediate release on the prior conditions, not merely an order to hold a hearing.
- Future re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter that considers bond eligibility.
- Detention after an executable final removal order with notice was expressly not decided, so that question remains open.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, so it is persuasive rather than binding. It shows how one Eastern District of California judge applies her own re-detention precedent after the Ninth Circuit's Padilla decision, which the government argues limits due process protections for people subject to the entry fiction. The court's answer is that Padilla addresses admission and does not authorize arbitrary detention.
The order is also a template for a prompt, practical remedy in this setting. It grants release without waiting for a reply, restores the pre-detention conditions, bars added restrictions absent a later hearing, and sets notice and hearing requirements for any re-detention. The decision rests on the court's own reading of Padilla and its prior orders, and the order does not address how the Ninth Circuit might treat that reading on appeal.