Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Chad Michael Creel, a self-represented plaintiff whose complaint was screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), sued the State Bar of California and Roy Kim in the Eastern District of California. He alleged that, after manufactured-housing disputes, he complained to the State Bar about attorney conduct and instead encountered delay, nonresponse, disciplinary secrecy, records resistance, procedural deflection, and inadequate explanation of what was investigated or why his complaints were closed. These are plaintiff's allegations; the order makes no finding that they are true.
Plaintiff had earlier filed a related action in Glenn County Superior Court. According to the order, that court found him a vexatious litigant, concluded he lacked a reasonable probability of prevailing because only the State Bar and the California Supreme Court have jurisdiction over attorney licensing and misconduct, and required a $7,500 security deposit. He did not post it, so the action was dismissed and judgment entered in August 2026. In a footnote, the magistrate judge observed that this state dismissal has no res judicata effect under California Code of Civil Procedure section 391.2 and that, because plaintiff does not challenge the state court's order, Rooker-Feldman did not appear to bar this action on that basis.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations, not a final judgment. He recommends that the first amended complaint (ECF No. 9) be dismissed without leave to amend and that the case be closed, on two independent grounds. The first is standing. Citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., which held that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another, the order relies on district court decisions from Washington and Oregon and the Tenth Circuit's decision in Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Association to conclude that a complainant has no cognizable interest in the discipline of a third-party attorney. Because plaintiff's claimed injuries stem from the State Bar's alleged failure to discipline an attorney, the order finds no direct injury sufficient for standing.
The second ground is jurisdiction. Relying on Sheller v. Superior Court and In re Rose, the order explains that since the 1951 amendment of the State Bar Act the California Supreme Court has been the sole judicial entity with jurisdiction over attorney discipline, with the State Bar acting as its administrative arm and making only recommendations. Because the complaint challenges how the Bar investigated and reported on plaintiff's complaints, the magistrate judge concludes the federal court lacks jurisdiction to review those actions. To the extent plaintiff instead challenges a California Supreme Court determination, the order says Rooker-Feldman would bar the claim, because only the United States Supreme Court may review a state court order. Citing Lopez v. Smith, the order finds leave to amend unwarranted because the complaint lacks merit entirely.
Key Takeaways
- A person who complains to the State Bar about a lawyer, under this recommendation, lacks Article III standing to sue the Bar or an individual defendant over an allegedly inadequate investigation or failure to discipline.
- The order treats the California Supreme Court as the exclusive judicial authority over attorney discipline, so a federal district court would not review the State Bar's investigative decisions.
- A state-court dismissal for failure to post vexatious-litigant security carries no res judicata effect under section 391.2, and Rooker-Feldman did not appear to bar the suit where the plaintiff did not challenge the state order.
- Liberal construction of a self-represented plaintiff's complaint does not permit a court to supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pleaded.
- Leave to amend may be denied where a complaint lacks merit entirely and cannot possibly be saved.
Why It Matters
This is a magistrate judge's recommendation, not a ruling by the assigned district judge, and it is not a reported decision with precedential weight. Any party may file objections within fourteen days of service, and failing to do so may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Until the district judge acts, the dismissal is not final.
If adopted, the recommendation would end this suit without a chance to amend, but the order does not decide whether any attorney committed misconduct or address the merits of plaintiff's underlying manufactured-housing disputes. It applies existing standing principles and California attorney-discipline authority, and its Rooker-Feldman discussion addresses only a hypothetical challenge to a California Supreme Court determination.