Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Wilson David Cardenas-Hernandez, proceeding without counsel, petitioned the Eastern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 24, 2026, challenging his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and moved for a temporary restraining order. Based on the parties' submissions, the court found that he entered the United States around May 20, 2012, and was transferred from local custody in Oklahoma to ICE custody around August 13, 2026, under a warrant. ICE served a notice to appear that day, and an ICE officer decided he would stay detained during removal proceedings. He then requested a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge on the Form I-286, but nothing indicated he received one.
On September 25, 2026, the court set a briefing schedule and told the government to identify any law or fact distinguishing the case from several of the court's earlier decisions, and to state any objection to ruling on the petition based on the existing briefing. Respondent Christopher Chestnut answered on September 27. The answer maintained that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs but acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit rejected that position in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160 (9th Cir. 2026), and held that § 1226(a) applies to people detained in the interior. Respondent argued only that petitioner may seek an immigration judge hearing and is entitled to no more than the bond hearing the statute authorizes. It stated no opposition to the court's plan to rule on the current briefing.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition by incorporating its reasoning in Escamilla-Santiago v. Andrews, No. 1:26-cv-07443-DAD-CSK (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2026), which it described as concluding that failing to promptly provide a custody redetermination hearing, after a detainee requested one by signing the Form I-286, violated due process. The Form I-286 submitted with the government's own answer showed petitioner had requested a hearing, and there was no evidence he received it. The court therefore concluded that his detention violated due process.
It ordered respondent to release petitioner immediately and enjoined re-detention for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, unless petitioner first receives notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, with the burden set under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations. The motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot, the clerk was told to serve the California City Immigration Processing Center, and judgment was directed for petitioner with the case closed.
The order does not address the merits of the removal proceedings, and it does not itself analyze the competing detention statutes; the Ninth Circuit decision appears as the government's acknowledgment, while the stated ground for relief is due process.
Key Takeaways
- The court ordered immediate release because petitioner requested a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge on the Form I-286 and the record showed no hearing.
- Relief rests on due process, adopting the reasoning of the court's October 26, 2026 decision in Escamilla-Santiago v. Andrews rather than analyzing the issue anew.
- The government acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock rejected its § 1225(b)(2)(A) position and applied § 1226(a), yet argued that only a bond hearing was owed.
- Re-detention is barred absent exigent circumstances unless petitioner first receives notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, with the burden set under § 1226(a) and its regulations.
- Judgment was entered for petitioner and the case closed, and the order does not address his removal proceedings.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, so it carries no precedential weight beyond its persuasive reasoning, and it largely incorporates a decision issued the day before. It illustrates how the court resolves individual habeas petitions from detainees who asked for a custody hearing and did not receive one, including where the government acknowledges the Ninth Circuit's view of the governing statute.
The reasoning depends on a documented hearing request and the absence of any hearing, so detainees who did not request one, or who received one, may be situated differently. The injunction's pre-detention hearing requirement and exigent-circumstances exception are the most practical features of the relief. Readers should consult Escamilla-Santiago for the full due process analysis, which this order does not restate.