Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Thirty-one Iranian citizens and one Sudanese citizen sued the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on January 19, 2026, while their Form I-765 applications for employment authorization were pending. They challenged two USCIS policy memoranda, issued in December 2025 and January 2026, that placed a hold on adjudicating immigration benefit applications filed by nationals of certain countries, including Iran and Sudan. The complaint sought to compel adjudication of the pending applications. It also sought related relief, including orders against nationality-based discrimination and against applying the memoranda to the plaintiffs. All parties consented to a magistrate judge deciding the case.
On April 16, 2026, the court granted a preliminary injunction that, among other things, ordered USCIS to adjudicate every pending Form I-765 application filed by any plaintiff within 180 days of its filing date. USCIS reported that by May 21, 2026, it had approved all of the plaintiffs' applications. The government then moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the case was moot. Plaintiffs opposed and moved for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction barring USCIS from subjecting any of their employment authorization applications to the hold. The court decided both motions without oral argument.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the motion to dismiss, denied summary judgment, and directed the clerk to close the file. Treating mootness as a jurisdictional question under Rule 12(b)(1), it concluded that approval of the applications pending at filing gave plaintiffs the relief the complaint sought, whether the case is viewed as an unreasonable-delay claim or a challenge to the hold. It rejected three arguments against mootness. One plaintiff's assertion that he had not received his work permit card failed because the government showed delivery and plaintiffs conceded receipt. Premium processing fee refunds, which only two of six affected plaintiffs had received when plaintiffs opposed the motion, no longer mattered because a joint status report confirmed all fees had been refunded; the court did not decide whether the complaint sought refunds. New applications that some plaintiffs had filed or could file were not part of the case, because the complaint and the preliminary injunction, read in context, concerned the applications pending when suit was filed.
The court also held that neither exception to mootness applied. On voluntary cessation, it accepted that the agency is appealing a Rhode Island district court decision in Dorcas that vacated the memoranda and would likely reinstate them if permitted. It nevertheless concluded that the alleged violation could not recur as to the already-adjudicated applications. On the capable-of-repetition exception, it reasoned that reinstating the hold would not affect those applications, and that any later applications fall outside this case. The order does not discuss leave to amend or whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- Approval of the applications that were pending when suit was filed moots claims seeking their adjudication, even where the agency acted only because a preliminary injunction required it.
- A court reads the scope of a complaint, and of its own preliminary injunction, in context; here the word 'any' in the injunction was held to reach only applications pending at filing, not future ones.
- Voluntary cessation and capable-of-repetition arguments fail where the relief sought has been obtained for the specific applications at issue, even if the agency may revive the policy elsewhere.
- Plaintiffs worried about the hold being applied to newly filed applications would need to raise those applications in a new or properly amended claim, because the court held they are not part of this case.
Why It Matters
The ruling shows how a preliminary injunction that forces adjudication can end a case through mootness rather than a merits decision. The court did not decide whether the policy memoranda are lawful, and it denied the request for a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs' newer applications remain outside this litigation.
The order also notes disagreement within the Northern District over whether the Dorcas vacatur, which is on appeal, moots injunctive claims in other challenges to the memoranda. It cited decisions rejecting the government's mootness argument and one going the other way, but did not need to resolve the question here. As an unpublished district court order by a magistrate judge, it carries no binding precedential weight and is useful only as persuasive reasoning.