Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Arreaza Sanchez, a Venezuelan citizen, received deferral of removal to Venezuela under the Convention Against Torture in February 2023 after an immigration judge denied asylum and withholding based on aggravated-felony convictions. The protection decision rested on findings concerning his serious psychiatric illnesses, need for medication, conditions in Venezuela, and a greater-than-fifty-percent likelihood of torture there. He was released under an order of supervision and participated in ICE's Intensive Supervision Appearance Program for approximately three years. ICE detained him at a March 25, 2026 check-in, but the court granted an unopposed habeas petition on April 20 and ordered release under his prior supervision conditions. ICE simultaneously imposed a new order requiring GPS monitoring, a 75-mile travel limit, and an April 27 report.
Local police arrested him on drug-related charges on May 3; those charges remained pending, and he left state custody around May 10. The parties disputed his subsequent ICE detention date. DHS records documented a June 1 revocation notice and informal interview based on the local arrest, while his filings variously alleged an April 27 or mid-to-late-May re-detention. On September 1, respondents first identified Mexico as a third-country destination and noticed removal on or after September 5. The court stayed removal, dismissed the initial petition with leave to amend, and accepted an amended petition presenting ten grounds concerning foreseeable removal, third-country fear procedures, and supervision revocation.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied Grounds 5 and 6. It found that ICE's June 1 paperwork suggested arrest, revocation notice, and an informal interview occurred together, complying with the cited supervision-revocation regulations. Arreaza Sanchez supplied no sworn declaration or other competent contrary evidence, and his asserted arrest date changed between filings. The court therefore held that he had not established entitlement to relief on those procedural due-process and APA claims.
Grounds 2 and 3 were granted. Applying Andriasian and district decisions addressing third-country removals, the court concluded that respondents did not dispute that, absent the stay, Arreaza Sanchez would have been removed to Mexico without an opportunity to present country-specific fear claims. The July 2025 ICE memorandum had the same defects found in earlier policies: officers would not affirmatively ask about fear, and removal could occur within six hours after notice. Ground 1 also succeeded because respondents' answer failed to substantively address the Zadvydas claim despite the court's standing-order warning. Independently, the uncertain time required to raise and adjudicate a Mexico fear claim prevented the court from finding removal reasonably foreseeable. Grounds 4 and 7 through 10 were dismissed as moot because release on Ground 1 supplied the only relief those grounds sought; their merits were not decided.
The order required immediate release and permitted a contempt show-cause request if release did not occur within three days. Before removal to Mexico or any country absent from the removal order, respondents must provide a meaningful opportunity and at least 10 days to raise a fear-based claim. If reasonable fear is demonstrated, they must move to reopen; if not, they must allow a meaningful opportunity and at least 15 days to seek reopening. Re-detention is barred until those procedures are completed and a significant likelihood of reasonably foreseeable removal exists. A separate footnote states that any EAJA fees require a compliant post-judgment motion.
Key Takeaways
- The court required destination-specific notice and a genuine opportunity to assert fear before a third-country removal, rather than treating CAT protection for Venezuela as transferable clearance for Mexico.
- An unanswered Zadvydas ground can be granted under the court's standing order, but this decision also identified an independent record basis for doubting reasonably foreseeable removal.
- The operative injunction specifies 10-day and 15-day opportunities and a government motion to reopen after a reasonable-fear showing; it does not expressly order USCIS referral or completion of every resulting proceeding.
- The petitioner lost the revocation-notice grounds because the government's contemporaneous paperwork was unrebutted by competent evidence, not because the court endorsed every substantive basis for revocation.
- Release was immediate, while future removal and re-detention remained possible only under the order's express procedural and foreseeability conditions.
Why It Matters
This unpublished district-court order applies Ninth Circuit notice principles to a proposed removal to Mexico and ties the legality of continued detention to the unresolved process for presenting a new country-specific fear claim. Its practical importance lies in the detailed sequence governing release, fear claims, reopening, and any later detention. The decision does not invalidate ICE policy nationwide, decide the pending state charges, adjudicate the moot revocation theories, or award attorney's fees.