Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Julio Cesar Arellano Solis, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board had dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge's order denying his application for cancellation of removal. The memorandum refers to the Immigration Judge and the Board together as the Agency.
The only agency ruling the memorandum describes is the Agency's conclusion that Arellano Solis violated the terms of his probation for purposes of the Federal First Offender Act. The memorandum does not describe the underlying offense, the type of probation, the form of cancellation sought, or how the probation finding connected to eligibility. It also does not say what his briefing argued.
The case was submitted on October 30, 2026, without oral argument, after the panel unanimously found it suitable for decision on the briefs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2). The panel consisted of Judges R. Nelson and H.A. Thomas and District Judge P. Casey Pitts, sitting by designation. The court stated that it had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition for review. It held that Arellano Solis did not meaningfully dispute the Agency's conclusion that he violated his probation for purposes of the Federal First Offender Act, and that he therefore forfeited the issue, citing Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022). The memorandum does not reach whether the probation-violation finding was correct.
The court added that Arellano Solis failed to raise any other arguments on appeal. With no preserved challenge identified, the Agency's denial of cancellation of removal was left undisturbed. The memorandum contains no discussion of the standard of review or of the substantive Federal First Offender Act question.
In a footnote, the court denied his opposed motion to stay removal and lifted the temporary stay of removal that had been entered under General Order 6.4(c), effective immediately. Both the motion and the temporary stay were docketed at Dkt. No. 2. The petition is denied outright, and the order does not remand or direct any further agency proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- A petitioner who does not meaningfully dispute a specific agency conclusion forfeits that issue, and the Ninth Circuit will not reach its merits on the petitioner's behalf.
- The memorandum rests entirely on forfeiture of the Federal First Offender Act probation-violation issue and on the absence of any other argument. It does not decide whether the Agency's probation finding was legally or factually correct.
- The court denied the motion to stay removal and lifted the temporary stay under General Order 6.4(c) effective immediately, so that stay no longer prevents removal under this court's order.
- The disposition is an unpublished memorandum that, by its own terms, is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so it carries limited weight beyond this case.
- The petition was denied rather than remanded, and the order directs no further agency proceedings.
Why It Matters
This unpublished memorandum is a routine application of the rule that issues not meaningfully argued are forfeited. It is useful mainly as an illustration for immigration practitioners. A petition may fail without the court ever evaluating the agency's reasoning if the briefing does not squarely challenge the finding on which the denial of relief rests. Here that finding concerned probation under the Federal First Offender Act, but the court offered no analysis of that statute.
Because the disposition is not precedent and contains no reasoning about the Act, it should not be read as endorsing the Agency's probation-violation determination or as announcing any rule about how the Act applies in cancellation proceedings. Its practical effect is limited to this petitioner: the Agency's denial stands and the temporary stay of removal has ended. Parties may cite it only as Rule 36-3 permits.