Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anderson Mark Perouse, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago proceeding without counsel, filed a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for appointment of counsel. He entered the United States in December 2009 on an F12 visa and had been continuously detained since February 11, 2026. An immigration judge ordered his removal to Trinidad and Tobago on July 22, 2026. Neither party appealed, and the August 21 appeal deadline passed.
Perouse filed the petition and counsel motion on September 8, 2026. The warden moved to dismiss on September 20, arguing that the final removal order made detention mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Perouse did not oppose the motion or dispute the government's account of his immigration history. His petition raised an Accardi Doctrine claim based on post-removal regulations, Fifth Amendment claims concerning arbitrary or prolonged detention and the lack of an individualized custody determination, and a Fourth Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act claim concerning his re-arrest.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge concluded that the removal order became administratively final on August 22, 2026, after the appeal period expired. The statutory 90-day removal period therefore began that day and was calculated to end November 20, 2026. Because Perouse remained detained within that period, the court found that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2) and recommended denying habeas relief. The court explained that detention is required during the removal period, while later release or continued detention is governed by other statutory provisions.
The court declined to reach the Accardi and Fifth Amendment claims, relying on Ninth Circuit authority that detention during the 90-day removal period withstands constitutional scrutiny. It likewise declined to apply the Zadvydas prolonged-detention analysis or reach the Fourth Amendment and APA claim because the record showed detention under the mandatory 90-day provision rather than indefinite post-removal-period confinement. The court separately found that the interests of justice did not require appointed counsel. It ordered the counsel motion denied without prejudice and recommended that the habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice, the warden's dismissal motion be granted, and the case be closed. These recommendations remained subject to objections and review by the assigned district judge.
Key Takeaways
- A final removal order started a 90-day statutory removal period running August 22 to November 20, 2026, during which the court found Perouse's detention mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the habeas petition without prejudice rather than issuing a final judgment, so the dismissal permits refiling and awaits district-judge action.
- The court did not decide the merits of the Accardi, Fifth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, or APA claims because detention remained within the mandatory removal period.
- The Zadvydas prolonged-detention analysis was not applied to detention authorized only for the 90-day removal period on this record.
- The motion for appointment of counsel was denied without prejudice by direct order, and the parties received fourteen days to file objections to the findings and recommendations, with failure to object risking waiver of appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes detention during the mandatory removal period from potentially indefinite detention after that period expires. On the court's calculation the period would end November 20, 2026, so the recommendation addressed the lawfulness of Perouse's custody at that stage rather than resolving every possible future challenge to continued detention after the removal period lapses.
The order also illustrates the different dispositions within findings and recommendations: the magistrate judge directly ordered denial of appointed counsel, while the petition's dismissal, the government's motion to dismiss, and case closure were recommendations requiring action by the assigned district judge. The court warned that failure to file timely objections could waive the right to appeal the district court's order.