Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Alexander Alarcon Bayas, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 13, 2026, challenging his immigration detention at the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility. The same day he moved for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release. The court set a briefing schedule, asked the government to explain whether anything distinguished the case from earlier decisions of that court, and asked whether it opposed a ruling on the petition itself based on the existing briefing.
On the parties' briefing, the court found that Bayas entered the United States around May 25, 2023, was detained by immigration authorities, and was paroled into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). He was re-detained on July 31, 2026, apparently without notice of the reasons or a chance to contest the re-detention. The government acknowledged the earlier parole but argued he is lawfully held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and, as a parolee subject to the entry fiction doctrine, has no due process rights beyond those the statute provides. It relied on the Ninth Circuit's September 2026 decision in Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. The government did not oppose the court deciding the merits on that briefing.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the government's reading of Padilla. Quoting an earlier decision from the same district, it explained that Padilla treated the entry fiction as an admission issue rather than a detention issue, and that Padilla recognized the government cannot arbitrarily detain people, including noncitizens. The court noted that numerous courts in the circuit read Padilla the same way, citing decisions from the Central District of California and the Western District of Washington. Because Bayas challenged the lawfulness of his present detention rather than his admissibility, the court concluded that Padilla does not change the due process analysis for his detention.
On the merits, the court reasoned that because Bayas had previously been released from immigration detention on parole, he was entitled to notice and pre-deprivation process before being re-detained, and he received neither. It relied on its earlier decision in Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, which found that a prior parole release created a liberty interest in continued release. The court did not separately decide whether § 1225(b) otherwise authorizes detention of someone in his position.
The court granted the petition and ordered Bayas released immediately on the same conditions that applied before his re-detention. It enjoined the government from re-detaining him for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, unless it first gives him notice and a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government must justify detention by clear and convincing evidence. The court also granted in forma pauperis status, denied the temporary restraining order and appointment-of-counsel motions as moot, and directed the clerk to enter judgment for Bayas and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court read Padilla as confining the entry fiction doctrine to admission questions, so it did not strip a paroled noncitizen of due process protections against detention.
- In this court's view, prior release on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) created a liberty interest in continued release that requires notice and pre-deprivation process before re-detention.
- The relief is individual and conditional: release now, with future re-detention barred absent exigent circumstances unless a bond hearing is first held at which the government bears a clear and convincing burden.
- The ruling rests on the court's own earlier reasoning and on persuasive district decisions, not on a new appellate holding, so it does not bind other courts.
Why It Matters
The order shows how district courts in the Eastern District of California are applying the Ninth Circuit's new Padilla decision, rejecting the government's effort to extend the entry fiction from admission into detention. It follows the court's own earlier rulings, and the court observed that numerous courts in the circuit read Padilla similarly.
This is a district court order resolving a single petition, and it did not address whether § 1225(b) otherwise governs the detention of people in Bayas's position. What remains open is any future bond hearing, where an immigration judge would decide whether the government has met its burden, and any appeal the government might take. Other courts may reach different conclusions.