Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
LIV Worldwide sued its former law firm, Thoits Law, for malpractice arising from the firm's earlier representation of LIV in a federal copyright action. The legal services contract governing that representation contained an arbitration clause. Thoits moved to compel arbitration and to stay the district court case. See ECF Nos. 36 (motion), 37 (opposition), 38 (reply).
LIV opposed on several grounds: that the California Arbitration Act (CAA), not the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), governed; that the CAA preserved judicial review rights the FAA would not; that Thoits was effectively trying to replace the contract's CAA-based process with the FAA's; and that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was presented on a pre-drafted form while LIV needed substitute counsel in a pending, high-stakes copyright case. LIV alternatively asked the court to decline to sever any unenforceable review safeguard and to require Thoits to waive arbitration or advance arbitration fees LIV said it could not afford.
The court found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacated the December 3, 2026 hearing under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).
The Court’s Holding
The unconscionability challenge failed for two independent reasons. First, California law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability to invalidate a contract, citing OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, 8 Cal. 5th 111, 125 (2019), but LIV raised only a procedural challenge. Second, there was no evidence of procedural unconscionability: LIV's CEO declared that he read the arbitration agreement, and the agreement expressly advised LIV of its right to consult independent counsel and its ability to reject the arbitration clause by lining it out.
LIV conceded that its claims fell within the engagement agreement's broad arbitration clause. Its argument that Thoits sought to supplant the contract's CAA process with the FAA's was rejected because Thoits requested arbitration in accordance with the parties' agreement. The court declined LIV's alternative request to address severance of a review safeguard, calling it an unripe, hypothetical breach-of-contract dispute. The request to compel Thoits to waive arbitration or advance LIV's fees was denied as borderline frivolous and lacking any basis in law.
The court granted the motion to compel arbitration and stayed the action while arbitration pends, without prejudice to either party seeking to lift the stay. Starting February 1, 2027, the parties must file joint status reports on the arbitration every 60 days.
Key Takeaways
- A party resisting arbitration must raise both procedural and substantive unconscionability under California law; a purely procedural challenge cannot invalidate the agreement.
- Contract terms advising a client of the right to independent counsel and the ability to reject an arbitration clause weigh strongly against a claim of procedural unconscionability.
- A court will not adjudicate speculative future disputes about whether an arbitration clause's review provisions might later be breached or severed.
- Requests to compel a party to waive arbitration or fund an opponent's arbitration fees require a legal basis; unsupported demands may be rejected as frivolous.
- Even after compelling arbitration, the district court retains the case in a stayed posture and can require periodic joint status reports to monitor the arbitration.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates how courts apply unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clauses in attorney-client engagement agreements and reinforces that informed consent and express opt-out rights defeat procedural unconscionability claims.
The decision also shows courts declining to resolve hypothetical enforcement questions about arbitration review mechanisms and instead enforcing the agreement as written, while maintaining supervisory oversight through a stay and recurring status reports.