Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ramiro Nunez-Reyes, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review a Board of Immigration Appeals order that affirmed an immigration judge's denial of cancellation of removal. The agency rested its decision on one ground: Nunez-Reyes had not shown that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen daughter, the requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The case was submitted without oral argument, and the panel unanimously concluded it was suitable for decision on the papers.
The court stated that it had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). As the panel later noted, Wilkinson matters because the facts found by the agency are not open to the court's review. The panel reviewed the Board's hardship determination under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard described in Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996 (9th Cir. 2025). Under that standard, the determination is conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Bennett and H.A. Thomas and District Judge Tiffany M. Cartwright of the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition. It held that the record does not compel the conclusion that Nunez-Reyes's daughter would suffer out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon hardship if her father were removed. Relying on the Board's order, the court pointed to several facts. The daughter would remain in the United States with her mother, who would provide emotional, physical, and financial support. She has no compelling medical or special needs that would go unmet if her father were removed. And Nunez-Reyes would likely be able to find employment in Mexico, allowing him to keep supporting her financially.
Because the court may not review those facts, citing Wilkinson, it concluded that the Board reasonably found the hardship to the daughter would not deviate, in the extreme, from the norm. That finding covered any mental health issues she might suffer from the removal. The panel also rejected Nunez-Reyes's contention that the Board applied the wrong standard by failing to consider the future hardship his daughter would experience, saying the record belied that claim. The disposition is simply a denial of the petition, and a footnote states that the stay of removal is lifted. The memorandum does not address any other form of relief.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit reviews the Board's exceptional and extremely unusual hardship determination for substantial evidence. It will disturb the ruling only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.
- Under Wilkinson, the panel treated the facts underlying the hardship finding, such as the daughter's living situation and her father's job prospects, as outside its review.
- Evidence that the child will remain with a parent who can provide emotional, physical, and financial support, and has no compelling medical or special needs, supported the Board's finding of no qualifying hardship here.
- The likelihood that the removed parent could find work in Mexico and keep supporting the child financially formed part of the factual picture the Board relied on.
- A claim that the Board ignored future hardship will fail when the record shows the Board did consider it.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished memorandum disposition. By its own terms it is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so it does not bind future panels. It does illustrate how the court applies Gonzalez-Juarez and Wilkinson to a common cancellation-of-removal fact pattern.
For practitioners, the decision shows how difficult it is to overturn a Board hardship ruling when the child has a remaining supportive parent, no special medical needs, and a parent who can seek work abroad. It also shows that a legal-error argument framed as a failure to consider future hardship needs support in the record. The ruling resolves only this petition. It does not decide whether different evidence could satisfy the hardship standard.