Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pedro Mejia-Chajal was detained by immigration authorities in August 2026 after having previously been released into the community. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 along with a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking his immediate release, arguing that his re-detention without advance notice or a hearing violated due process.
Before ruling, the court flagged that it had already decided the same legal question in a series of recent cases — Selis Tinoco v. Noem, Labrador-Prato v. Noem, D.L.C. v. Wofford, and Altin v. Chestnut — each holding that the government must provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before re-detaining a noncitizen previously released on bond, conditional parole, or humanitarian parole. The court directed the government to explain whether anything about Mejia-Chajal’s case was materially different. In response, the government argued only that Mejia-Chajal had received adequate post-deprivation procedural protections, that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that detention was constitutional while removal proceedings were pending — without identifying any new bond hearing he had actually received, or addressing why his situation differed from the prior cases. The government noted, but did not develop any argument about, Mejia-Chajal’s 2023 DUI arrest and more recent arrests for driving on a suspended license.
The Court’s Holding
Because the government identified no fact or legal argument distinguishing Mejia-Chajal’s case from the court’s prior rulings, and because the noted driving-related arrests did not show the kind of changed circumstances that would justify detaining him without advance notice or a hearing, the court granted both the TRO motion and the habeas petition on the due process ground, following the reasoning of its recent decision in Altin v. Chestnut. Rather than simply ordering a future bond hearing, the court held that the proper remedy for the government’s failure to provide a constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation hearing was Mejia-Chajal’s immediate release, on the same conditions that applied before his August 2026 detention, with all of his personal documents returned.
The court made clear that if the government later wishes to re-detain Mejia-Chajal, it must give at least seven days’ notice and hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. The order does not address what happens if he later becomes subject to an executable final order of removal with proper notice.
Key Takeaways
- When the government cannot identify any fact that distinguishes a new case from a court’s established line of rulings, that failure itself can be decisive in granting immediate relief.
- Prior arrests for driving-related offenses did not, on this record, amount to the kind of changed circumstances needed to justify re-detention without advance notice and a hearing.
- Where the remedy for a due-process violation in this context is immediate release rather than merely ordering a belated hearing, courts are also requiring the government to return the released person’s identification, passport, and other seized documents.
- Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a bar where the core claim is a constitutional due-process challenge to the re-detention itself, not an immigration-court issue the agency could resolve.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces a now well-established rule in the Eastern District: the government must give advance notice and a hearing before re-detaining someone it previously released, or face release as the remedy. For immigration defense counsel, it is also a practical lesson in litigation strategy — when a court invites the government to distinguish a case from its prior rulings and the government fails to do so, that failure can resolve the case quickly and decisively in the detainee’s favor.