Reported / Citable
Background
California voters may write in a presidential candidate, but the vote is counted only if the candidate has timely filed declarations naming a complete slate of presidential electors and alternates. Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich challenged that system after pursuing write-in candidacy, arguing that requiring 108 elector-related declarations burdened candidates and voters and caused otherwise validly marked ballots not to be counted.
Ehrenreich sought a writ against Secretary of State Shirley Weber. The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected his constitutional claims, and he appealed. The Third District treated the case as a facial challenge—an argument that the statutes themselves are invalid in the great majority of their applications—because Ehrenreich attacked the statutory scheme generally rather than a particular way officials had applied it to him.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework used for election regulations, the court found that the declaration requirements impose less than a severe burden. They do not bar write-in candidacies outright, charge a filing fee, or demand proof of broad voter support. Instead, they require a presidential write-in candidate to identify people who can serve as California’s electors if that candidate wins.
California’s countervailing interests were legitimate and important. Because voters technically select presidential electors, the state may require a qualified slate to exist before votes can produce an administrable Electoral College result. The requirements also promote orderly elections, prevent confusion, and protect the integrity of the tabulation process. Under the flexible balancing test, those interests were sufficient to justify the limited burden.
The court rejected the premise that every name written in the presidential space must be counted regardless of compliance with candidacy rules. California may condition recognition of a write-in presidential vote on the candidate’s advance qualification. Ehrenreich also failed to develop several collateral theories, including objections to voter instructions and an asserted federal-law “literacy test,” so those arguments did not establish error.
Key Takeaways
- A presidential write-in vote in California is not automatically countable merely because the voter correctly writes a name on the ballot.
- A write-in candidate must timely submit the elector and alternate-elector declarations required by the Elections Code; those filings connect the popular vote to the Electoral College mechanism.
- Courts weigh election regulations under the Anderson-Burdick test: severe burdens receive demanding review, while lesser burdens generally survive when supported by important regulatory interests.
- A facial challenge carries a high burden. A challenger must show that the statutory system is unconstitutional in the great majority of cases, not simply identify a possible hardship or hypothetical problem.
- Appellants must support separate theories with legal authority and reasoned analysis. Passing references to voter instructions or federal statutes will not preserve an undeveloped claim.
Why It Matters
The decision gives election officials and prospective presidential write-in candidates a clear compliance rule. Campaigns cannot wait until ballots are cast to address the elector paperwork, and voter-education efforts should not imply that writing any name necessarily produces a tabulated presidential vote. Counsel advising a campaign should calendar statutory deadlines and verify every elector declaration before relying on write-in access.
More broadly, the opinion illustrates how California courts review ballot-access rules that regulate rather than prohibit participation. Practitioners challenging an election rule should build an evidentiary record showing the rule’s concrete burden and frame carefully whether the claim is facial or as applied. Government lawyers defending such a rule should identify the operational election interests served by each requirement, because those interests drive the constitutional balance. Evidence about actual compliance costs and available alternatives will usually be more persuasive than abstract claims about voting rights.