California Case Summaries

Eduardo Domingo Aguilar v. Warden, California City Immigration Processing Center; David J. Venturella; Markwayne Mullin; and Todd Blanche — Habeas petition granted and immediate release ordered after re-detention of noncitizen previously allowed to remain at liberty

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Eduardo Domingo Aguilar v. Warden, California City Immigration Processing Center; David J. Venturella; Markwayne Mullin; and Todd Blanche
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Not specified
Date Decided
2026-11-16
Docket No.
1:26-cv-08493
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration detention, habeas corpus, due process, bond hearing, re-detention, TVPRA asylum, exhaustion

Background

Petitioner Eduardo Domingo Aguilar, a twenty-seven-year-old Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor in or before 2016. Border Patrol encountered him in Arizona on October 8, 2016, and released him to a sponsor. In 2025, immigration authorities detained Aguilar, but an immigration judge terminated proceedings without prejudice and released him because he had waited fifteen years for USCIS to adjudicate his Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act application, had been held for three months without government action, had no criminal record, and appeared eligible for relief.

Aguilar continued living peacefully at liberty while his affirmative TVPRA application remained pending. On September 1, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers abruptly re-detained him during a traffic stop in Jacksonville, Florida, while driving to work. Aguilar highlighted that federal officials cited no new criminal charges, infractions, or changed circumstances justifying his re-arrest. He received a custody determination notice on October 22, 2026, but did not seek immigration judge review.

Proceeding pro se from California City Immigration Processing Center, Aguilar filed a habeas petition and temporary restraining order motion on October 16, 2026, alleging unconstitutional detention without due process. Respondents opposed on October 23, 2026, arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) governed. However, respondents conceded that under Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) controls, yet they asserted the petition should be dismissed because Aguilar failed to exhaust administrative remedies by requesting an immigration judge redetermination hearing.

The Court’s Holding

The district court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered respondents to release Aguilar immediately. Relying on its decisions in Medvezhov v. Warden, Arikapudi v. Andrews, and Tusov v. Andrews, the court held that when a noncitizen lives at liberty while immigration proceedings proceed pursuant to the government's affirmative choice not to detain him, the Due Process Clause guarantees a protected liberty interest. Under such circumstances, re-detention is unconstitutional unless the government proves at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual is a flight risk or community danger.

The court determined that Aguilar's situation mirrors Medvezhov, Arikapudi, and Tusov. The government received his TVPRA asylum application years ago, knew of his presence in the United States, and permitted him to remain at liberty. Because respondents presented no new legal arguments or factual grounds distinguishing this case from that line of authority, the court rejected their administrative exhaustion objection. The court explained that when a noncitizen is re-detained under these conditions, the burden rests on the government to prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence, rather than on the detainee to exhaust administrative proceedings.

Consequently, the court enjoined and restrained respondents from re-detaining Aguilar without first demonstrating flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence before a neutral arbiter. The court directed respondents to provide Aguilar a copy of the order upon release, directed service on California City Immigration Processing Center, instructed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case, and terminated pending motions as moot. In footnote 1, the court explicitly noted that its order does not address the circumstances under which respondents may detain Aguilar if he becomes subject to an executable final removal order.

Key Takeaways

  • A noncitizen who has lived at liberty pursuant to the federal government's affirmative decision possesses a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
  • When immigration authorities re-detain a noncitizen who has been living at liberty, the government bears the initial burden of proving flight risk or community danger by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
  • Respondents conceded that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies under Ninth Circuit precedent in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, and their administrative exhaustion defense failed because the government carried the constitutional burden.
  • The court ordered immediate release and enjoined re-detention absent the requisite clear-and-convincing showing, while explicitly reserving the legal standards governing detention if the petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces Eastern District of California jurisprudence safeguarding noncitizens from abrupt re-detention after years of living at liberty with pending humanitarian claims, confirming that prior release creates an enduring Fifth Amendment interest that shields individuals from unilateral re-arrest.

The ruling also establishes that the government cannot bypass its clear-and-convincing burden through administrative exhaustion arguments, while leaving open detention parameters once a final removal order becomes executable.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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