Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Juan Oscar Dominguez entered the United States in 1988 and, over the following years, was convicted of several drug-related offenses. An immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba in 2000, and that order became final when no appeal was filed. Immigration authorities detained him after the removal order but released him on an order of supervision in 2006, requiring periodic check-ins with ICE.
Dominguez continued to live in the community for nearly two decades, though he was convicted of domestic battery in 2008 and drug trafficking in 2016. Despite learning of the 2016 conviction and his scheduled release from state custody in 2021, ICE did not take him back into custody at that time. Instead, agency records show Dominguez continued reporting for his periodic check-ins without incident until October 24, 2025, when ICE detained him at one of those check-ins and revoked his order of supervision. The agency’s own records did not explain why he was taken into custody that day, and he had not been arrested or convicted of any new offense since his 2021 release.
By the time of this ruling, Dominguez had been held for roughly eleven months. He petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing his detention had become unconstitutionally prolonged and that re-detaining him after years of supervised release without a new hearing violated due process. The government opposed release, arguing he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because of his criminal history.
The Court’s Holding
The court sided with Dominguez and ordered his release. It first rejected the government’s legal premise: because Dominguez is already subject to a final order of removal, his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) — the post-removal-order detention statute — not by § 1226(c), which only applies while removal proceedings are still pending. The government, the court noted, offered no authority suggesting otherwise and simply asserted in passing that either provision could apply.
Applying the framework from Zadvydas v. Davis, the court explained that detention under § 1231(a)(6) is presumptively reasonable for up to six months after a removal order becomes final. Beyond that point, if the detained person offers good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the burden shifts to the government to rebut that showing or release him. Dominguez’s eleven months in his most recent stint of detention cleared the six-month mark easily. On the second step, the court found Dominguez’s showing thin but just enough: despite periodic efforts, the government had not removed him in the 26 years since his removal order issued, and nothing in the record suggested any renewed progress toward executing it. The government offered no rebuttal at all, resting entirely on its mistaken § 1226(c) argument. With no evidence that removal was likely in the foreseeable future, the court held continued detention unconstitutional and ordered Dominguez released within seven days under appropriate conditions of supervision.
Key Takeaways
- Once a noncitizen is subject to a final order of removal, the government’s detention authority comes from 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), not the pending-proceedings provision of § 1226(c) — even if the person also has a serious criminal record.
- A removal order’s age matters: the government’s inability to execute removal for decades can itself support a finding that removal is not likely in the foreseeable future.
- Once a detained person makes even a modest showing under Zadvydas, the burden shifts to the government to produce evidence of an imminent removal plan — silence on that point can be fatal to continued detention.
- Years of compliant check-ins under an order of supervision, without new immigration violations, weighed in the petitioner’s favor even though he had an intervening criminal conviction.
Why It Matters
This ruling is a useful illustration of how California’s federal courts apply the Zadvydas six-month presumption in practice, particularly for noncitizens with old, unexecuted removal orders. It clarifies that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) cannot be invoked once a removal order is final, regardless of a person’s criminal history — a distinction that matters for both government counsel and immigration defense attorneys litigating custody disputes.
For practitioners representing long-term supervised releasees who are suddenly re-detained at a routine ICE check-in, the decision offers a template for building the record needed to shift the burden back to the government on removability.