Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
David Morales Garcia, an immigration detainee proceeding pro se when he filed, submitted a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition on September 28, 2026, challenging his immigration detention and seeking immediate release and an injunction against re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing. He also sought a temporary restraining order. Respondents — the Adelanto warden, the ICE Los Angeles Field Office director, the DHS Secretary, and the Attorney General — answered and opposed the TRO request. The court appointed counsel, the petitioner filed a traverse, and the parties consented to the magistrate judge for all purposes.
The factual record was disputed. Respondents' Form I-213 identified Morales Garcia as a Mexican national and stated that immigration authorities took him into custody on May 2, 2026, when he appeared in a Florida state court proceeding on pending charges of aggravated battery with great bodily harm. The petitioner alleged a different custody date and claimed he had lived in the United States since 2010 with family, church, and employment ties. The court noted that the Form I-213's reference to a 2013 conviction appeared to be a typographical error because the record instead showed an information charging a 2023 offense and a 2026 plea offer.
Morales Garcia raised four claims: arrest without a warrant allegedly violated the INA; detention without prior notice or a pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process; continued detention violated substantive due process; and the denial of a meaningful bond hearing violated 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the APA. The court framed the analysis under the Fifth Amendment's procedural and substantive due process protections, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test for procedural claims and the fundamental-rights framework for substantive claims.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Morales Garcia was entitled to a Rodriguez bond hearing because he had been detained for more than 180 days. Respondents acknowledged that the Rodriguez class injunction provided such a hearing after six months of detention, and the court calculated that the entitlement arose on October 29, 2026. It therefore granted the petition at least to the extent of ordering that hearing within fourteen days.
The court denied immediate release. It found that the Form I-200 warrant supplied a lawful basis for the arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that the pending aggravated-battery charge involving serious bodily injury appeared to trigger mandatory detention under the Laken Riley Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). The court agreed with respondents that release was unavailable but that the bond hearing was required.
The order requires respondents, within fourteen days of entry of judgment, either to provide the hearing under Rodriguez v. Robbins, at which the government bears the burden of proving danger or unmitigable flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, or to release Morales Garcia if the hearing is not timely provided. A petitioner-requested delay may extend the deadline, and respondents must file a notice of compliance within three days after the hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A detainee held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in the Central District of California remains within the Rodriguez bond-hearing framework, including where mandatory detention is asserted under the Laken Riley Act.
- Cross-checking the government's own detention records matters: the court identified an apparent date error in the Form I-213 and relied on the charging document and plea offer instead of treating the claimed 2013 conviction as established.
- Even where immediate release is denied, a completed 180-day detention period can independently support an enforceable bond-hearing remedy with a government-side clear-and-convincing burden.
- The order builds in compliance accountability through a notice-of-compliance requirement and permits reasonable delay only at the petitioner's request.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates how habeas review of immigration detention can produce partial relief: the court enforced the existing Rodriguez procedural remedy while respecting statutory mandatory-detention authority. It also shows the court treating the Laken Riley Act's charged-conduct provision as a potential basis for continued detention without resolving the ultimate removal or criminal case.
The order is notable for its treatment of an unresolved appellate posture. A footnote records that the Ninth Circuit had directed the Rodriguez injunction vacated but that the mandate had not issued because a rehearing petition remained pending, leaving the injunction operative for this ruling. That issue remains open and could affect the remedy's future availability.