Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Sandly Dieujuste, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States on or about March 30, 2024. According to the petition and the respondents’ filing, the Department of Homeland Security processed him and released him from immigration custody that same day on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). He remained in the country continuously after his release, applied for asylum and withholding of removal, and received employment authorization. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers detained him on August 3, 2026.
Dieujuste sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his detention violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He had not received a bond hearing because the government maintained that he was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The respondents argued that Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock did not apply to noncitizens who, like Dieujuste, had previously been released on parole.
The operative petition was filed in Case No. 26-cv-05264-RBM-VET, but the order was docketed in Case No. 3:26-cv-05110-RBM-VET because that was the lead case in the consolidated proceedings. The order identified Alejandro Monsalve as Dieujuste’s habeas counsel. Although the filing metadata lists October 13, 2026, the order’s signature block is dated October 14, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition in light of the respondents’ non-opposition and its prior orders granting similar petitions. Although the respondents asserted that § 1225(b) required mandatory detention, they conceded that they had insufficient information about termination of Dieujuste’s parole, did not oppose the petition, and deferred to the court on appropriate relief. The court therefore did not adopt the government’s mandatory-detention position or separately resolve every legal theory presented in the petition.
The court also decided that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing while Dieujuste remained detained, was the appropriate remedy. Relying on decisions addressing the inadequacy of post-deprivation custody hearings, it reasoned that a later hearing could not prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty and that a detained petitioner would already have suffered the injury sought to be avoided. The order directed the respondents to release Dieujuste immediately, subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole.
Before any re-detention, the court required a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether detention was warranted. At that hearing, Dieujuste must bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. If the immigration judge finds bond appropriate, the judge must consider alternative release conditions and Dieujuste’s ability to pay. The court expressly declined to address the petition’s remaining grounds for relief in light of this disposition.
Key Takeaways
- The government’s non-opposition and admitted lack of information about parole termination were central to the court’s decision to grant the petition.
- The court ordered immediate release subject to Dieujuste’s preexisting parole conditions rather than leaving him detained while awaiting a bond hearing.
- Any re-detention must be preceded by an immigration-judge hearing at which Dieujuste bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a danger or flight risk.
- A bond determination under the order must include consideration of alternative release conditions and the noncitizen’s ability to pay.
- The grant of habeas relief did not resolve every claim because the court expressly left the petition’s remaining grounds unaddressed.
Why It Matters
The order distinguishes release from the alternative of a post-detention bond hearing and treats the timing of custody relief as consequential. Its remedy restores Dieujuste to parole conditions while prescribing procedures and substantive considerations for any future detention decision.
The decision is also specific to its procedural setting: the government did not oppose the petition and conceded a lack of information about parole termination. The court relied on that posture and its earlier similar orders, so the ruling should not be described as a comprehensive adjudication of the APA and due-process theories or of every mandatory-detention argument.