Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Kenneth Kimes, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the warden of R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, and Does 1–20. He sought money damages for an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. Kimes also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, supplying a prison certificate and trust-account statement showing an average monthly balance of $179.37, average monthly deposits of $72.32, and an available balance of $168.11.
Kimes alleged that on May 15, 2024, his cell and the surrounding area became engulfed in toxic chemical smoke from a lithium-battery fire near the prison. According to the complaint, he became light-headed, dizzy, and nauseous; officials did not evacuate him, turn off air vents, or provide a mask; and he was forced to inhale smoke, choked, passed out, and suffered long-term injuries. These were allegations being screened, not facts established after an evidentiary hearing.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California screened the prisoner complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). That screening uses the same failure-to-state-a-claim standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): factual matter must make relief plausible, while conclusory accusations are insufficient. The court addressed the filing fee and each defendant group separately rather than treating the serious conditions alleged as automatically establishing liability.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted IFP status and assessed an initial partial filing fee of $35.87, collectible only if sufficient funds were available when the order was executed. It directed collection of the remaining $350 statutory fee through monthly payments equal to 20 percent of the preceding month’s income. The court explained that IFP status relieves a prisoner of paying the entire fee upfront, not of the ultimate obligation to pay the statutory fee.
On the merits of screening, the court dismissed CDCR because Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to that state agency and California has not waived immunity for § 1983 damages claims in federal court. It dismissed the claim against the RJD warden because Kimes alleged no specific action or inaction by the warden. The court also reiterated that supervisors are not liable under § 1983 merely for subordinates’ conduct; personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct is required.
The Doe claims failed because the complaint referred to defendants vaguely and collectively without identifying conduct by any individual unnamed defendant. The court explained that an amended complaint seeking claims against unknown persons must identify them individually and specify what each did. It dismissed the entire complaint without prejudice and gave Kimes until December 28, 2026 to amend. The amended complaint must be complete by itself, and claims not re-alleged may be waived. If Kimes does not timely amend, the court said it will enter a final order dismissing the action for failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute in compliance with the amendment order.
Key Takeaways
- Serious alleged exposure to toxic smoke does not eliminate the requirement to connect each defendant to the claimed constitutional deprivation.
- CDCR was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, while the warden and Doe defendants were dismissed for defendant-specific pleading deficiencies.
- The court granted IFP status but required a $35.87 initial partial fee when funds are available and installment payments toward the full $350 statutory fee.
- Kimes received leave to file a self-contained amended complaint by December 28, 2026, so the dismissal was without prejudice and was not yet a final dismissal of the entire action.
- An amendment must identify individual Doe defendants and describe each person’s conduct rather than attributing all conduct to defendants collectively.
Why It Matters
The order separates the objective seriousness of prison conditions from the pleading requirements for particular defendants. Although the court recognized that Eighth Amendment duties can include protection from hazardous conditions, it did not decide whether Kimes’s allegations satisfied both the objective and subjective deliberate-indifference components. Its dispositive analysis instead rested on CDCR’s immunity and the absence of individualized allegations against the warden and Doe defendants.
The decision also provides concrete amendment instructions and preserves an opportunity to cure the complaint. It does not resolve the truth of the smoke-exposure allegations, adjudicate any defendant’s liability after discovery, or finally terminate the action. The stated consequence of missing the amendment deadline is a future final dismissal, making the deadline and the requirement to re-allege preserved claims central to the case’s next stage.