Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Patricio Edison Expinoza-Gallo, an immigration detainee, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A state court had vacated his criminal conviction under California Penal Code § 1473.7, and an immigration judge terminated his removal proceedings on November 18, 2025. The Department of Homeland Security appealed that termination to the Board of Immigration Appeals on December 15, 2025, leaving the administrative case unresolved.
The petition argued that the statutory authority for detention had ceased, that detention without a bond hearing violated due process, that continued detention served no legitimate purpose, and that he was entitled to a bond hearing or immediate release. Respondents countered that he remained properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) while the DHS appeal was pending. The magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending denial without prejudice, and the petitioner filed timely objections.
The Court’s Holding
The district court conducted de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and adopted the findings and recommendations in full. It agreed that the immigration judge's termination order is not final while a timely DHS appeal is pending before the BIA, citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 and recent district decisions. Because the removal proceedings remain administratively pending, detention authority under § 1226(a) continues, and the termination order does not by itself provide a basis for release.
On the procedural due process claim, the court found no error in the magistrate judge's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors as guided by Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland. The petitioner had already received a bond hearing, did not appeal the bond determination, and declined to seek a new hearing for materially changed circumstances under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e), while the government retained a substantial interest in administering the immigration laws through the appeal. On the substantive due process claim, the court found nothing in the record showing the detention was punitive or unrelated to a legitimate regulatory purpose, noting the immigration judge's unappealed danger finding based on three DUI convictions.
The court also rejected the petitioner's request to hold the petition in abeyance and direct him to file a § 1003.19(e) motion, observing that he identified no legal authority for that disposition and that the court would not order him to invoke a process available to him by statutory right without court involvement. The petition was denied without prejudice and the clerk was directed to close the case.
Key Takeaways
- An immigration judge's termination of removal proceedings does not end detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) while a timely DHS appeal to the BIA remains pending, because the order is not final under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39.
- A detainee who received a bond hearing, did not appeal the bond ruling, and declined to seek a § 1003.19(e) hearing for changed circumstances faces an uphill battle on a Mathews-based procedural due process claim for a second bond hearing.
- A substantive due process challenge to continued detention fails absent record evidence that the detention is punitive or excessive in relation to the government's regulatory interest in resolving the pending removal case.
- Courts in the Eastern District of California have repeatedly held that termination of removal proceedings is not a proper basis for release until the termination ruling becomes final.
- A request to hold a habeas petition in abeyance while the petitioner pursues an administrative process already available by statutory right is unlikely to succeed without supporting legal authority.
Why It Matters
The order reinforces a consistent line of Eastern District of California authority holding that DHS's pending BIA appeal keeps removal proceedings—and § 1226(a) detention authority—alive even after an immigration judge terminates the case. It also illustrates how Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland and the Mathews framework are applied to deny second bond hearings where detainees have not exhausted the § 1003.19(e) process for materially changed circumstances.
Because the denial was without prejudice, the petitioner may renew his challenge if circumstances change, such as a final BIA decision in his favor or a materially prolonged detention, but the order signals that vacating the underlying conviction alone does not compel release while the government's appeal is unresolved.