Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jose Miguel Rivera Santiago, an immigration detainee, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against Tonya Andrews and other respondents. The case was docketed as No. 1:26-cv-08118-DJC-JDP, and the court's release order was filed on October 19, 2026. The court stated that it had previously addressed the legal issues raised in the petition in Morillo v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01533-DJC-AC (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2025), and E.L.D.M. v. Becerra, No. 1:25-cv-01906-DJC-JDP (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the court directed respondents to file a return showing cause why the court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus and order Rivera Santiago's release on the same basis (ECF No. 7). A footnote explained that the court initially cited cases involving individuals who had been encountered but later released, but later information provided by respondents established that those decisions were more applicable because Rivera Santiago had not previously been contacted.
In light of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), respondents conceded that binding precedent establishes a statutory right to a bond hearing (ECF No. 8 at 1).
The Court’s Holding
The court concluded that, although respondents conceded that binding precedent establishes a statutory right to a bond hearing, the lengthy delay in providing the statutorily mandated bond hearing violated Rivera Santiago's due process rights and justified release. Accordingly, the court ordered that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) be granted for the reasons stated in its prior decisions and orders.
Respondents were ordered to immediately release Jose Miguel Rivera Santiago from their custody and not to impose any additional restrictions on him unless that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. If the government seeks to re-detain him, it must provide no less than seven days' notice to him and must hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at which his eligibility for bond must be considered.
The order expressly does not address the circumstances in which respondents may detain Rivera Santiago in the event he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal. The Clerk of the Court was directed to serve Golden State Annex with a copy of the order, to close the case, and to enter judgment for petitioner, and the order resolves all pending motions.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted Rivera Santiago's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered his immediate release from respondents' custody.
- Respondents' concession that binding precedent establishes a statutory right to a bond hearing did not defeat relief, because the court held that the lengthy delay in providing that hearing violated due process and justified release.
- The grant of habeas relief was expressly made for the reasons stated in the court's prior decisions and orders.
- Any government effort to re-detain Rivera Santiago requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter under section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.
- The order did not decide the separate question of detention if Rivera Santiago becomes subject to an executable final order of removal, and it closed the case with judgment for petitioner while resolving all pending motions.
Why It Matters
The order applies binding Ninth Circuit precedent recognizing a statutory bond-hearing right while separately treating prolonged delay in providing that hearing as a due process violation warranting release. It also sets concrete procedural safeguards for any attempted re-detention, including advance notice and a hearing before a neutral arbiter at which bond eligibility must be considered.
At the same time, the order expressly reserves the distinct issue of detention under an executable final order of removal, so the ruling should not be read as resolving every possible future basis for custody.