Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Sahil Sahil, an immigration detainee proceeding without a lawyer, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On September 4, 2026, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations proposing that the petition be granted and that Sahil receive a bond hearing. The parties were given fourteen days after service to object, and the respondent filed objections on September 18, 2026.
The respondent first argued that Sahil had already received sufficient process through a bond hearing in October 2024, relying on Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland. The district court distinguished that decision because it concerned detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), where procedures were available to seek review of the detention determination in immigration court. Sahil, by contrast, had been detained for more than twenty-four months since his earlier hearing and was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), without a statutory right to seek another bond hearing.
The Court’s Holding
Reviewing the matter de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the court concluded that the findings and recommendations were supported by the record and proper analysis. It held that Sahil's prolonged detention for more than two years while his immigration proceedings remained pending entitled him to another bond hearing as a matter of due process. The court therefore adopted the findings and recommendations, granted the habeas petition, and denied Sahil's motion for a temporary restraining order as moot.
The court rejected the respondent's reliance on Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam for the proposition that Sahil had no detention-related due process rights beyond those supplied by statute. It followed the Ninth Circuit's explanation in Padilla v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement that Thuraissigiam was an admission case, not a detention case, and did not displace precedent extending Fifth Amendment due process protections to noncitizens within the United States. The court also rejected placing the burden on Sahil: because his § 1225(b) detention had become prolonged, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger warranting continued detention.
The operative order requires a bond hearing before an immigration judge within fourteen days, consistent with Singh v. Holder. The immigration judge must consider Sahil's financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release if he is found not to be a danger and not so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond. Sahil must receive a copy of the order immediately and seventy-two hours' notice before the hearing in a language he understands. He may have counsel, and the deadline may be extended at his request to obtain one. If the hearing is not held within fourteen days, the respondent must release him. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment for Sahil, terminate remaining motions as moot, and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A prior bond hearing did not resolve Sahil's due process claim because he had remained detained for more than twenty-four months afterward and lacked a statutory route to another hearing under § 1225(b).
- The court treated Thuraissigiam as an admission decision rather than a basis for eliminating constitutional procedural protections concerning detention.
- At the new hearing, the government bears the burden of proving flight risk or dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.
- The immigration judge must consider financial circumstances and alternative release conditions when the required findings do not justify detention without bond.
- Failure to provide the hearing within fourteen days requires Sahil's release, while the temporary restraining order motion and other pending motions were resolved as moot.
Why It Matters
The decision applies prolonged-detention due process principles to a noncitizen held under § 1225(b), emphasizing that mandatory detention does not itself answer when an additional bond hearing becomes constitutionally necessary. It also places the burden on the government and requires consideration of less restrictive release conditions rather than treating detention without bond as automatic.
The order supplies concrete procedural safeguards and an enforceable consequence for noncompliance: notice in an understandable language, an opportunity to obtain counsel, a hearing within fourteen days, and release if that deadline is missed. The court entered judgment for Sahil and closed the case.