Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Shawn Arlin Donley, incarcerated at Madera County Jail, brought a pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wellpath Medical, medical staff, and jail administrators. His complaint sought injunctive relief and damages for alleged medical mistreatment at the jail. Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone denied Donley's first motion to appoint counsel on June 11, 2024. Donley filed a second motion to appoint counsel on May 1, 2026, and Judge Boone denied that motion as well.
On May 18, 2026, Donley moved to disqualify Judge Boone under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Donley contended that Judge Boone had wrongly found no exceptional circumstances warranting counsel and routinely denied counsel without cause to indigent litigants proceeding without lawyers. Judge Boone denied the disqualification motion on May 20, 2026, concluding that Donley had not demonstrated bias in the decisions denying counsel. Donley then sought reconsideration on July 21, 2026, leading to this order by the district court.
The Court’s Holding
The district court denied reconsideration. It explained that reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) generally requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law, absent highly unusual circumstances. Local Rule 230(j) also requires the moving party to identify new or different facts or circumstances or other grounds for relief. Merely disagreeing with the earlier decision or repeating arguments already considered does not satisfy that burden.
The court found that Donley's disqualification and reconsideration motions relied on the same facts: Judge Boone had authorized in forma pauperis status but declined to appoint counsel. Donley identified no newly discovered evidence and no clear error of law. His assertion that the refusal to appoint counsel knowingly placed him at a disadvantage did not establish a basis for recusal.
Applying § 455(a)'s objective standard, the court asked whether a reasonable person would perceive a significant risk that the judge would decide the case on a basis other than the merits, with the reasonable person defined as a well-informed, thoughtful observer rather than someone hypersensitive or unduly suspicious. It also applied the extrajudicial-source limitation, which generally requires a basis for recusal other than judicial rulings, opinions, or statements made during the proceedings. Donley pointed to nothing outside Judge Boone's rulings. The court further held that the counsel decisions were consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), under which counsel may be designated only in exceptional circumstances after considering the likelihood of success and the litigant's ability to present the claims in light of the legal issues' complexity. Judge Boone's observation that the case was not exceptional and that similar cases arose frequently did not show partiality to an objective observer.
Key Takeaways
- A party seeking reconsideration must do more than repeat disagreement with an earlier ruling; the motion must present a recognized ground such as new evidence, clear error, or changed controlling law.
- Adverse rulings on requests for appointed counsel do not, without more, establish judicial bias or require disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
- Section 455(a) uses an objective, reasonable-observer standard rather than treating a litigant's suspicions or unsupported accusations as sufficient for recusal.
- The extrajudicial-source limitation generally requires something beyond a judge's rulings or statements in the case, and Donley identified no such outside source.
- The order resolves only Donley's reconsideration motion concerning disqualification; it does not decide the merits of his underlying medical-mistreatment claims.
Why It Matters
The decision keeps Judge Boone assigned despite Donley's challenge and illustrates the demanding standards governing both reconsideration and recusal based on adverse procedural rulings. It distinguishes disagreement over the discretionary denial of counsel from objective evidence that a judge cannot decide a case impartially.
For indigent civil litigants, the order also underscores that in forma pauperis status does not itself create an entitlement to appointed counsel. The exceptional-circumstances inquiry remains separate from recusal, and dissatisfaction with its outcome does not supply the missing evidence of bias.