Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Byron Levingston proceeded without counsel in this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Christian Pfeiffer and other defendants. On September 21, 2026, the court revoked his in forma pauperis status and ordered him to pay the full filing fee within 30 days. He responded on October 15 with a combined request for a 45-day extension and injunctive relief concerning the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's handling of incoming court mail.
Levingston said he had asked the Inmate Trust Office to apply incoming funds to his court filing fees. He also said his brother sent $150, but prison officials directed $60 to two earlier actions. He submitted an inmate request form, receipt, and statement report to support his assertion that he was trying in good faith to comply. The court found good cause for more time and calculated from the October 5 statement that he then owed $182.42, comprising a $127.42 balance on the original $350 filing fee plus a $55 administrative fee.
His injunction request alleged that CDCR personnel retained his legal mail beyond normal security procedures and opened it outside his presence. He specifically said the court's September 21 order was postmarked September 22 and that, when he signed for it on September 29, he noticed the envelope had already been opened. The operative case, however, concerned an October 2022 incident at Kern Valley State Prison: an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Pfeiffer and San Antonio and an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against San Antonio.
The Court’s Holding
The extension was granted as an immediate order. Relying on the district court's broad discretion over litigation and its docket, the magistrate judge found good cause and directed Levingston to pay the full filing fee within 45 days after service of the order. The discussion described the required amount as the $405 filing fee minus sums already paid, while the footnote supplied the balance calculation as of October 5.
The mail request received a different procedural treatment: the magistrate judge recommended denial rather than entering a final injunction ruling. The court explained that emergency relief requires jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and Rule 65(d)(2) limits whom an injunction binds. CDCR was not a party, and the single incident involving mail sent by the court did not justify the extraordinary order sought, notwithstanding Levingston's assertion that CDCR agents were acting in concert.
Independently, the requested injunction did not arise from claims pleaded in the operative complaint, which contained no allegations about sending or receiving mail. Levingston also made no showing on any Winter factor: likely success, likely irreparable harm, the balance of equities, or the public interest. The court characterized any asserted future injury as conclusory and speculative. It therefore submitted findings and recommendations to the assigned district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), allowing written objections within 14 days of service, capped at 15 pages, with no new exhibits.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted a concrete procedural accommodation—45 days from service to pay the full filing fee—after Levingston documented his efforts and the diversion of part of the money sent to him.
- The injunction request was only recommended for denial, so the findings and recommendations did not themselves constitute the district judge's final disposition of that request.
- CDCR's nonparty status and the absence of mail-related claims in the operative complaint were independent obstacles to the requested relief.
- The court also found no evidentiary showing on likelihood of success, irreparable harm, equities, or public interest, and rejected speculative future injury as insufficient.
- Parties had 14 days after service to object, and the order warned that failing to object could waive the right to challenge the magistrate judge's factual findings on appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision separates a litigant's documented difficulty paying a court fee from the much heavier burden for emergency injunctive relief. Financial records and a stated good-faith effort supported additional time, but they did not supply the jurisdictional connection, pleaded claim, or Winter showing needed for an injunction.
It also illustrates the limits of using a motion in an existing prisoner civil-rights case to obtain relief against a nonparty about a different subject. The recommendation leaves the injunction issue for district-judge review through the objections process, while the fee-extension order took effect immediately.