Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Oleksandr Vladimirovich Melnyk, an immigration detainee, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asserting that he suffered irreparable harm through violation of due process and suspension of his liberty. He sought a declaration that his ongoing detention violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and immediate release. Respondents argued the petition, his third before the court, was successive and should be dismissed, and that he was subject to mandatory detention and not entitled to relief because he had received a bond hearing and was denied bond on March 3, 2026.
The magistrate judge found the petition should not be dismissed as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and declined to apply the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine because Melnyk lacked sufficient notice of the doctrine and was proceeding pro se. The magistrate judge rejected the government's mandatory-detention position under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), noting that Melnyk entered at a border checkpoint, was detained two days, released on an Order of Supervision, and resided in the United States for almost four years before re-detention, making him subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test as used in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the magistrate judge found the factors weighed in the government's favor and against a second bond hearing, and recommended denying the petition.
The Court’s Holding
Melnyk filed timely objections, arguing that the issue was his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing, that the appropriate remedy was release rather than a bond hearing, that his bond hearing was unconstitutional because the burden was placed on him, and that the second and third Mathews factors weighed in his favor. The court rejected the release-only remedy argument, citing its prior decisions holding that where a petitioner has a criminal history, a bond hearing may be sufficient relief for a due process violation based on failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing. The court noted it was undisputed that Melnyk had a criminal history and found his objection unpersuasive.
The court agreed with the magistrate judge that Melnyk's circumstances were similar to those in Rodriguez Diaz, where the Ninth Circuit found the Mathews factors weighed against a due process violation despite a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty interest, and held the magistrate judge did not err in finding the second and third Mathews factors weighed against a second bond hearing. The court declined to consider Melnyk's new claim that his bond hearing was unconstitutional because it was raised for the first time in objections, though the facts were known when the petition was filed. A footnote added that in a related case the court had reviewed the bond-hearing recording and found the immigration judge explicitly placed the burden of proof on respondents, contradicting Melnyk's argument. After de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the court adopted the findings and recommendations, denied the petition, and directed the clerk to terminate pending matters as moot and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A detainee subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who already received a bond hearing is not automatically entitled to a second one; the Mathews v. Eldridge factors govern, and here they weighed in the government's favor.
- Release is not the only appropriate remedy for re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing, particularly where the petitioner has a criminal history; an individualized bond hearing may suffice.
- The court declined to apply the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to a pro se petitioner who lacked sufficient notice of the doctrine, even though he could have raised his claims in earlier petitions.
- New claims raised for the first time in objections to findings and recommendations may be rejected in the court's discretion when the underlying facts were known at the time the petition was filed.
- The petition was denied and the case closed after de novo review, with the findings and recommendations adopted in full.
Why It Matters
The order reinforces that immigration detainees who enter at a checkpoint, are released on supervision, and reside in the United States for an extended period fall under discretionary detention authority rather than mandatory detention, and that the Rodriguez Diaz/Mathews framework controls requests for a second bond hearing. It also illustrates the court's willingness to excuse abuse-of-the-writ concerns for pro se filers while still enforcing limits on new arguments raised only in objections.
The decision underscores that a due process violation based on the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing does not necessarily compel release, especially for detainees with a criminal history, and that the court's own record of immigration proceedings can defeat a belated claim that the burden of proof was unconstitutionally placed on the detainee.